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Equality of Opportunity and the Schoolhouse Gate  
The Schoolhouse Gate: Public Education, the Supreme Court, and 
the Battle for the American Mind 
B Y  J U S T I N  D R I V E R  
P E N G U I N  R A N D O M  H O U S E ,  2 0 1 8  
abstract.  Public schools have generated some of the most far-reaching cases to come be-
fore the Supreme Court. They have involved nearly every major civil right and liberty found in 
the Bill of Rights. The cases are often reflections of larger societal ills and anxieties, from segre-
gation and immigration to religion and civil discourse over war. In that respect, they go to the 
core of the nation’s values. Yet constitutional law scholars have largely ignored education law as a 
distinct area of study and importance. 
 Justin Driver’s book cures that shortcoming, offering a three-dimensional view of how the 
Court’s education law jurisprudence has evolved over the past century. The Court, once loath to 
intervene in school affairs, increasingly recognized that students’ constitutional rights do not end 
at the schoolhouse gate. But that extension has not been without limitations, pause, or contro-
versy. Driver vividly narrates both the Court’s internal conversations and those occurring in 
broader society. Most importantly, Driver helps the reader see how the Court’s decisions were 
not preordained, could have gone a number of different ways, and heavily influenced the history 
that followed. 
 This Book Review, however, argues that no account of the Court’s education precedent is 
complete without a detailed examination of how the Court’s decisions have affected equal oppor-
tunity. The attempt to ensure equal educational opportunity is ultimately the tie that binds so 
much of the Court’s precedent. Unfortunately, the Court’s doctrine on this score has not been 
one of consistent expansion. In fact, too often the Court has limited students’ rights and, thus, 
the educational opportunities they receive. This failure is clearest in two areas: those cases impli-
cating a constitutional right to education and school desegregation. 
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introduction 
Justin Driver’s The Schoolhouse Gate: Public Education, the Supreme Court, 
and the Battle for the American Mind excels in two key respects. As a book about 
education law, it weaves together disparate doctrines and discrete issues into a 
cogent whole. This is no small accomplishment, given the broad spectrum of 
questions the Supreme Court has addressed in schools: racial segregation, 
funding, immigration, free speech, religion, corporal punishment, suspension, 
and LGBTQ rights. Reviewing over a century of cases, Driver highlights com-
pelling themes that allow the reader to see the Court’s education cases as a 
long, ongoing conversation about the extent to which the Court must defer to 
educators while also protecting students’ rights and enforcing the Constitution. 
Given the substance of these cases and their wide-ranging impact, Driver ar-
gues the Court’s education cases have been underappreciated and are, in fact, 
potentially the most important venue in which the Court acts.
1
 The Schoolhouse 
Gate puts education law on the map. 
As a book about constitutional law, Driver’s work may be even more sig-
nificant. Driver aims to contest the growing conventional wisdom among aca-
demics that the Supreme Court is primarily a conservative institution that 
merely follows public opinion and, thus, does not play a major role in shaping 
society.
2
 He details a number of major school cases—from segregation to free 
speech to immigration—in which the Court’s decisions were entirely at odds 
with public opinion at the time they were released but managed to shift public 
opinion over the course of time.
3
 He also recasts a number of cases that others 
have critiqued as failures,
4
 convincingly arguing that the Court threaded a nee-
dle in those cases and delivered moderate opinions so as to avoid social back-
 
1. JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND 
THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 9 (2018) (stating his thesis that public schools are 
“the single most significant site of constitutional interpretation”). 
2. Driver points to BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS IN-
FLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009), 
and MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004), as prime examples of this thinking. DRIVER, supra 
note 1, at 439 n.35. 
3. See, e.g., DRIVER, supra note 1, at 21-22 (pointing to five different countermajoritarian deci-
sions by the Court on issues ranging from religious schools and prayer to desegregation and 
undocumented students, all of which he analyzes in depth later in the book). 
4. See, e.g., id. at 115-24 (emphasizing that Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), could have 
permitted even more egregious regulations of student speech and that the limited and nar-
row holding in the case did relatively little to restrict student speech). 
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lash while still producing doctrinal victories for student rights.
5
 In sum, for 
those not yet willing to give up on the Court, The Schoolhouse Gate is a breath 
of fresh air. 
The breadth and ambition of The Schoolhouse Gate are its greatest strengths. 
But in an effort to construct a metanarrative, Driver treats all doctrines and is-
sues as roughly equal in importance.
6
 The various cases appear as data points 
in service of a larger story. Many scholars—including us—would argue that the 
Court’s education cases are not equal. Some would insist free speech and reli-
gion cases have had the most significant effect on public education, while oth-
ers would emphasize the influence of discipline, discrimination, and desegrega-
tion cases.
7
 Rather than assign particular significance to any single area, Driver 
seeks to elevate the entire field of education law—an important accomplish-
ment indeed. But one area—equality of educational opportunity—gets too little 
attention. Equality of educational opportunity includes the fundamental right 
to an education and school-segregation law. We argue these two lines of equali-
 
5. For instance, the Court’s student free speech cases following Tinker v. Des Moines Independ-
ent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), appear contradictory and regressive, but 
Driver argues that the Court’s decision in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 
260 (1988), permitting the school to excise certain stories from the school papers was not 
nearly as confused as many argue today, nor was that case at odds with Board of Education, 
Island Trees Union Free School District v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), which placed limits on the 
school’s ability to remove books from the library. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 111-15. Driver’s 
analysis does not eliminate all of our concerns regarding those cases, but he does lessen the 
weight of those concerns. He fairly closes the chapter on free speech with a section demon-
strating that “[w]hile Tinker is best construed as retaining vitality, that position should not 
be mistaken for complacency.” Id. at 127. Driver similarly says that the Court’s decision in 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), which extended due process rights to suspended students, 
must be assessed against a number of background factors, not solely against observers’ 
wishes for what the case should have said. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 153-58. While we would 
still quibble about the extent to which Goss achieved meaningful substantive change, Driv-
er’s point is well taken and worth making. For a discussion of those continuing concerns, see 
Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Limit of Zero Tolerance in Schools, 99 MINN. L. REV. 823, 
855 (2015), which notes that “the internal flaws of Goss and the subsequent cabining of its 
doctrine have resulted in due process practices that, as a practical matter, are often reduced 
to a sham.” 
6. Freedom of expression and school desegregation, for instance, clock in at sixty-nine and sev-
enty-three pages, respectively, while the punishment and investigation of student misbehav-
ior clock in at forty-four and fifty-seven pages, respectively. More substantive comparisons 
follow below in Section I.C. 
7. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
111, 111 (2004) (arguing that without judicial action toward desegregation, equal education 
opportunity “will never exist”); John H. Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. 
L. REV. 321, 338 (1979) (contending that “free speech plays an important role in the child’s 
development”). 
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ty doctrine tower above the rest of education law. Deeper analysis of those two 
lines of doctrine, moreover, would reveal that they have the potential to re-
shape the entire metanarrative undergirding education law if properly under-
stood. 
The Schoolhouse Gate’s introduction states: 
One cannot plausibly claim to understand public education in the Unit-
ed States today . . . without appreciating how the Supreme Court’s de-
cisions involving students’ constitutional rights shape the everyday re-
alities of schools across the country. . . . At its core, this book argues 
that the public school has served as the single most significant site of 
constitutional interpretation within the nation’s history.
8
 
In exploring that thesis, the book treats the Court’s school cases as a series 
of tussles that involve two recurring conflicts. One is the doctrinal conflict over 
school authority. The Court consistently struggles to balance the clear require-
ments of the Constitution against the harms of interfering with and undermin-
ing school administrators.
9
 In other words, the scope and appropriateness of a 
constitutional review of school policies is the major subtext of the Court’s 
school cases. 
The second is the conflict between society and the courts, with schools 
stuck in the middle. Driver does not frame it exactly that way. Rather, he em-
phasizes that the Court has decided many of our nation’s most controversial 
cultural issues in the school context.
10
 His conclusion regarding the importance 
of education law follows naturally from that point. But the question remains: 
why have schools played this role? The answer lies in public schools’ unique 
ability to capture the “nation’s cultural imagination,” reflect its “social con-
cerns,” and “illuminate[] both the hopes and the fears” of the people.
11
 Thus, 
when cultural and constitutional conflicts arise, litigants naturally choose pub-
lic schools as their battlefield. This phenomenon alone justifies Driver’s special 
attention to education law as a distinct strand of the Court’s jurisprudence. 
Driver explores both of these themes well, but, because of the scope of his 
book, he does so at a level of abstraction. Respect for schools’ authority is 
about managing institutional relationships, and problems arise any time the 
Court reviews another branch of government’s actions. This is not unique to 
 
8. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 9. 
9. Id. at 16-19. 
10. Id. at 10-12. 
11. Id. at 10-11. 
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education. Further, because cultural-legal wars will inevitably occur, so too will 
school cases. The way the Court shapes actual educational opportunities and 
experiences is another important part of the story. And understanding it re-
quires a deeper examination of the theoretical and doctrinal underpinnings of 
the Court’s cases, which we provide here. 
The Schoolhouse Gate treats issues like school discipline, searches and sei-
zures, desegregation, funding, and equal access as doctrinally and theoretically 
distinct—bound together by the Court’s general concerns over judicial inter-
vention and school authority. In doing so, Driver neglects the central unifying 
concern of the Court’s most important cases: the nature and scope of the con-
stitutional right to education.
12
 In the Court’s most significant cases, the ten-
sion over school authority is an outgrowth of the substantive weight and sig-
nificance of the underlying right at stake—the right to education.
13
 If the Court 
were to acknowledge such a right, it would have no choice but to intervene in 
various educational contexts. Without that right, the Court is free to afford 
considerable weight to policy implications and to tweak around the edges of 
educational opportunity without ever fully validating the principle that the ed-
ucational opportunity should be equal.
14
 
In short, while school cases consistently force the Court to make tough de-
cisions regarding judicial intervention and school authority, the most central 
issue in the most important cases is whether the Constitution protects the right 
to education. Our nation has long been committed to such a right.
15
 Various 
 
12. See infra Part II. 
13. That right, as later sections argue, rests at the foundation of our democratic order. See infra 
Part II. 
14. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973) (expressing the 
Court’s reluctance to recognize a right to education because of the legislative policies in-
volved). 
15. Derek W. Black, The Fundamental Right to Education, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1059, 1081-85 
(2019); Kara A. Millonzi, Education as a Right of National Citizenship Under the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1286, 1303 (2003); George 
Washington, Eighth Annual Message of George Washington (Dec. 7, 1796), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washs08.asp [https://perma.cc/9ZQ9-2WV3] 
(“[A] primary object of such a [national university and a military academy] should be the 
education of our youth in the science of government. In a republic what species of 
knowledge can be equally important and what duty more pressing on its legislature than to 
patronize a plan for communicating it to those who are to be the future guardians of the lib-
erties of the country?”); cf. Thomas Jefferson, Sixth Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 
1806), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jeffmes6.asp [https://perma.cc/WX65 
-38ST] (calling for public funding of education). 
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state constitutions have explicitly recognized it.
16
 The Court routinely alludes 
to such a right.
17
 But it has never affirmatively recognized it. As a result, the 
Court has condoned educational inequality as often as it has interrupted the 
practice. This failure is the sad lynchpin that undergirds the Court’s most im-
portant cases. 
This Review proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of The 
Schoolhouse Gate and a critical assessment of its strengths, contributions, and 
limitations. Part II identifies the constitutional right to education as the most 
doctrinally and theoretically important issue in education law. Part II then de-
tails the right to education’s implications in several of the Court’s most im-
portant school cases. And finally, Part III examines the Court’s school-
integration jurisprudence, the area in which the right to equal education has 
been contested most consistently and most deeply. 
 
16. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (mandating the maintenance of a public-education sys-
tem because “[i]ntelligence and virtue [are] the safeguards of liberty and the bulwark of a 
free and good government”); MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“The stability of a republican 
form of government depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it shall be the 
duty of the Legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public schools.”); N.D. 
CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (mandating the creation of a free public-education system because “[a] 
high degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity and morality on the part of every voter in a 
government by the people [is] necessary in order to insure the continuance of that govern-
ment”); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 205 (Ky. 1989) (noting that 
the constitutional convention of 1890 justified the education clause as essential to the “pros-
perity of a free people” and to “develop[ing] patriotism and understand[ing] our govern-
ment”). John Adams authored the Massachusetts Constitution and placed an education 
clause in it, making it the nation’s oldest clause of its kind. It provided that “diffus[ion of 
education] generally among the body of the people [is] necessary for the preservation of 
their rights and liberties.” MASS CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § II. 
17. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (discussing the role of education in our dem-
ocratic order and quoting several other Supreme Court cases); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 
68, 76 (1979) (“Public education, like the police function, ‘fulfills a most fundamental obli-
gation of government to its constituency.’” (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 
(1978))); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (accepting the State’s proposition 
that “some degree of education is necessary . . . if we are to preserve freedom and independ-
ence”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (stating that education “is the very 
foundation of good citizenship”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“American 
people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme 
importance . . . .”). 
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i .  book overview  
A. Comprehensive Coverage and Approach 
The Schoolhouse Gate’s coverage is impressive. It persuasively puts to rest 
the notion that public education does not involve significant constitutional is-
sues.
18
 It does. Driver’s thesis is that “schools should be deemed our most sig-
nificant theaters of constitutional conflict.”
19
 His book reveals how school cases 
represent “the hopes and the fears that have captivated the American people 
during the last century.”
20
 Chapter One makes clear the controversial nature of 
school cases. The Court’s very first education cases, like those of today, in-
volved culturally divisive issues. From a doctrinal standpoint, the early cases are 
scattered, but they share common ground as battles over major cultural issues. 
Those cases waded into the racial, cultural, religious, and patriotic politics of 
the day. 
With that groundwork laid, Driver assigns the remaining chapters to each 
of the Court’s major constitutional subjects as played out in the school context: 
freedom of speech, student punishment, student searches, racial segregation, 
equality of opportunity beyond race, and religion. Driver’s treatment of such 
disparate subject matter and nearly all of the Court’s significant school cases is 
remarkable.
21
 In contrast, the leading education-law casebooks tend to provide 
thin coverage of a large number of issues or to skew heavily toward one area of 
the law.
22
 Michael and Sherelyn Kaufman’s Education Law, Policy, and Practice 
 
18. A typical constitutional law casebook, for instance, affords little to no attention to education 
as a distinct topic of analysis. The typical approach is a short reprint of San Antonio v. Rodri-
guez—and maybe an even a shorter one of Plyler v. Doe—to establish that education is not a 
fundamental right. See, e.g., CHARLES A. SHANOR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUC-
TURE AND RECONSTRUCTION 745 (3d ed. 2009); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 800 (18th ed. 2013). At least one case book does even less, using Ro-
driguez to make a point unrelated to education—that the Court would not accept fundamen-
tal rights grounded solely in equal protection. CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 743 (3d ed. 2009). 
19. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 9. 
20. Id. at 10. 
21. The book covers the First Amendment rights to speech and free exercise of religion, due 
process, cruel and unusual punishment, substantive due process, unreasonable search and 
seizure, privacy, equal protection based on race, equal protection based on gender, immigra-
tion status, fundamental rights, and separation of church and state. 
22. See, e.g., KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW (7th ed. 
2009); STUART BIEGEL, EDUCATION AND THE LAW (2d ed. 2009); LAWRENCE F. ROSSOW & 
JACQUELINE A. STEFKOVICH, EDUCATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2015); CHARLES 
J. RUSSO, REUTTER’S THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, at v (8th ed. 2012); RICHARD S. VACCA 
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and Derek Black’s Education Law: Equality, Fairness, and Reform are the only 
ones that come close to both depth and full coverage.
23
 The Kaufmans’ book, 
however, still focuses heavily on First Amendment issues, reducing all of equal 
protection to a single chapter.
 
Black’s book, while more evenly balanced, focus-
es on equality. Driver covers the full panoply of multiple constitutional subjects 
with clear competency and deep insight. The book could easily serve as the 
primary text for a class on education law or a perfect companion to a course us-
ing a casebook. 
Driver’s treatment of individual cases follows a general pattern. First, he 
offers the story behind each the case. His aim is to provide insight into the 
broader social forces that led to the case, as well as plaintiffs’ individual stories 
and motivations. For obvious reasons, the personal stories in old cases tend to 
be thinner, but Driver offers details on newer cases that many readers will find 
novel and important.
24
 Second, he efficiently explains the basic doctrine of each 
case and identifies the battle lines between the parties and members of the 
Court.
25
 In many instances, Driver’s explanations provide more clarity than the 
Court itself did.
26
 Driver’s lucid framing of the cases allows even the lay reader 
to move through multiple cases and eras without losing the narrative thread. 
Third, he looks outward, surveying contemporaneous media and scholarly re-
actions to the Court’s decisions. This allows the reader to see each case in the 
real-time social context in which the Court made each decision, free of the bias 
of retrospect. Fourth, Driver regularly explores the possibility of alternate out-
comes in the cases, considering the Court’s options as they stood at the time 
and whether those options were viable.
27
 Finally, he provides a cogent conclud-
 
& WILLIAM C. BOSHER, JR., LAW AND EDUCATION: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND COURT DECI-
SIONS (6th ed. 2003); MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW (5th ed. 
2012). 
23. DEREK W. BLACK, EDUCATION LAW: EQUALITY, FAIRNESS, AND REFORM (2013); MICHAEL J. 
KAUFMAN & SHERELYN R. KAUFMAN, EDUCATION LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE (2005). 
24. See, e.g., DRIVER, supra note 1, at 293-94 (explaining the parent organizing that led to the 
legal challenge in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701 (2007)); id. at 349-50 (telling how the plaintiff in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) 
watched his children stay home day after day because of the law that excluded them). 
25. See, e.g., id. at 75-78 (drawing the battle lines on each of the standards involved in Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)). 
26. See, e.g., id. at 94-95 (explaining clearly what the Court held in Bethel School District No. 403 
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), notwithstanding the fact that the Court had created new am-
biguities). 
27. Id. at 88-89 (considering a path not taken in Tinker); id. at 108-09 (considering an alternate 
approach to school-newspaper doctrine); id. at 201 (considering the downside of an alter-
nate approach to student searches). 
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ing analysis examining whether the Court got it “right.”
28
 Throughout, Driver 
exercises a restraint that other scholars often lack. This restraint serves a larger 
objective: focusing the reader’s attention on the drama playing out in the cases. 
B. Strengths and Major Contributions 
Driver’s approach produces several important gems for the reader. First, 
Driver humanizes the cases in ways that other scholars have not. He is forth-
right in this effort. In the introduction, he urges the reader to appreciate the 
plaintiffs in these cases because the “students and their families who contest 
school practices must often exhibit deep reservoirs of courage when the Su-
preme Court addresses their disputes.”
29
 He observes, and demonstrates 
throughout his narrative, that these families “resist not only the wishes of local 
educators but also the norms of their surrounding communities,” which can 
respond with “insults, hate mail, intimidating telephone calls, and even death 
threats.”
30
 In later chapters, Driver follows through with confirming details. 
The plaintiff group in Engel v. Vitale
31
—a school prayer case—started at fifty 
only to shrink to five by the time trial began.
32
 The Weismann family, in an-
other prayer case, received so much hate mail after filing their case that they 
turned it into a scrapbook.
33
 
Less explicit but equally effective is Driver’s humanization of the Court. 
The path of least resistance in a book like Driver’s is to speak simply of “the 
Warren Court,” “the Rehnquist Court,” or even more broadly just “the Court.” 
This, of course, reduces the Court to a thing rather than a group of individuals 
making incredibly difficult decisions. Driver does the opposite. For instance, he 
begins the book with a wedding story that seems to have nothing to do with 
litigation other than the fact that Justice Frankfurter was in attendance.
34
 But 
during the course of the wedding, the bride, groom, and others directly excori-
ate Justice Frankfurter for his opinion in Minersville School District v. Gobitis
35
—
 
28. Id. at 120-22 (arguing that in his assessment, the Court in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 
(2007), “unwisely betrayed the traditional First Amendment principle permitting re-
strictions on speech only if they are neutral with respect to viewpoint”). 
29. Id. at 15. 
30. Id. 
31. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
32. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 365. 
33. Id. at 383. 
34. Id. at 3-5. 
35. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
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a case upholding schools’ authority to compel students to pledge allegiance to 
the flag.
36
 Frankfurter had reasoned that it was not the role of courts to over-
turn or second-guess educators’ decisions.
37
 The wedding attendees, however, 
found it shocking that Frankfurter would ignore students’ rights and told him 
so.
38
 Under the weight of the combative discussion, Frankfurter eventually lost 
his composure and swore to never again discuss cases in social settings.
39
 
Other depictions offer a fuller measure of the Justices, including those of ill 
repute. Driver identifies Justice McReynolds as a racist, anti-Semitic, and mis-
ogynistic man with a “nasty temperament,” while at the same time acknowl-
edging that the Justice was more complex than those labels.
40
 Drawing on Jus-
tice McReynolds’s declaration that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the 
State,”
41
 Driver notes that McReynolds was among “at least a few figures who, 
while generally odious, were capable of admirable utterances.”
42
 Driver also 
offers details about Justice Powell that help explain his enigmatic school deci-
sions.
43
 And one of his most extended dives reveals how Justice Ginsburg 
played a pivotal role on an otherwise all-male Court in a case involving the 
strip search of a female middle-school student.
44
 In each of these cases, Driver 
highlights that Supreme Court cases involve people—from those bringing and 
deciding the cases to those watching from a distance. 
By humanizing both the litigants and the Court, Driver also allows the 
reader to see school cases as a conversation between the Court, schools, and the 
families involved. This accomplishment alone will keep the book relevant well 
into the future. Moreover, Driver helps scholars more fully appreciate the doc-
trine. He does this by consistently challenging conventional wisdom. For in-
stance, scholars regularly criticize the Court in Brown v. Board of Education II
45
 
 
36. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 5. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 3-4. 
39. Id. at 4. 
40. See id. at 60-61. 
41. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
42. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 61. 
43. While Powell’s prior service as a school-board member is well known, Driver digs deeper, 
developing Powell’s concerns about how busing “could devastate the sense of community 
engendered when youngsters living in the same neighborhood attended the same school.” 
Id. at 277. One need not agree with Powell to appreciate Driver’s humanizing efforts. 
44. Id. at 226-30. 
45. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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for requiring only that desegregation proceed with “all deliberate speed.”
46
 
Driver recognizes that this phrase eventually became the excuse for districts to 
delay desegregation, but he also emphasizes that the language was not imme-
diately perceived that way.
47
 Brown II included other strong language demand-
ing desegregation and, on the whole, represented a balanced approach to de-
segregation in light of the context—too slow for some and too rapid for 
others.
48
 Similarly, Driver rejects the notion that the Court’s validation of bus-
sing to achieve integration in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion
49
 provoked overwhelming outrage in white communities and was a failed 
policy idea. Driver highlights that eighty-seven percent of “the parents of chil-
dren who were bused to promote integration” viewed it positively,
50
 and he re-
counts how Charlotte residents perceived desegregation, not as a failure, but 
“as a rousing success.”
51 
The most powerful challenges to conventional wisdom, however, come in 
Driver’s exploration of alternative outcomes. His masterful hypotheticals and 
contrapositives demonstrate just how much the Court has achieved and how 
much we may now take for granted.
52
 Some of the most impressive examples 
come from the most unexpected places.
53
 Driver shows how, against those 
plausible possibilities, some of the Court’s holdings are far more impressive, 
more disappointing, or less egregious than previously thought. In some of 
 
46. See generally Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 613-14 (1983) (discuss-
ing those criticisms of Brown II). 
47. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 256-57. 
48. Id. at 257 (quoting Editorial, Prompt and Reasonable, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1955, at 28, which 
makes this point). 
49. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
50. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 293. 
51. Id. at 291. 
52. Driver’s free speech chapter, for instance, takes on the Court’s hotly debated and most criti-
cized student-speech cases. Driver argues that Tinker was more momentous than we appre-
ciate in retrospect—“resist[ing], rather than ratif[ying], the era’s prevailing attitudes on 
student dissent.” Id. at 84. The Court’s later cases do not curtail free speech as much as 
many would normally argue. Id. at 125. 
53. For instance, the Court today is often critiqued for demanding so little due process in Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), but Driver argues, based on the circumstances at the time, that 
the Court could have just as easily done nothing. Instead, the Court took a major step to 
vindicate the basic notion that the Constitution does apply in schools. DRIVER, supra note 1, 
at 155-56. While we might still contest Driver’s account to some extent, he makes clear here 
and elsewhere that we can mistakenly examine cases from a modern perspective that does 
not fairly account for the conditions of the time. He similarly argues that Morse v. Frederick, 
551 U.S. 393 (2007), “cannot be dismissed as an opinion that simply legitimated the status 
quo.” DRIVER, supra note 1, at 121. 
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these cases, Driver posits that had the Court done what some commentators 
proposed, it would have triggered backlash and resentment.
54
 For instance, 
with student-search cases, Driver argues that the Court’s low threshold for jus-
tifying student searches is not such a bad thing. Had the Court barred searches 
or made them more onerous to justify, school administrators would have just 
suspended students or restricted their movements and foregone searches.
55
 If 
forced to choose between school exclusion and a search, students may prefer 
the search, even if somewhat intrusive.
56
 On the other hand, he reasons that 
the Court in Tinker v. Des Moines “could have quite plausibly adopted a rule 
that afforded greater protection to students’ First Amendment rights than did 
the reasonable-forecast-of-substantial-disruption test.”
57
 Thus, while Driver 
defends Tinker,
58
 he also points out that the case is not the shining “high-water 
mark” in student free speech that we often assume it to be.
59
 
One does not have to agree with any of Driver’s particular arguments or 
revel in any particular backstory to appreciate the overall service he does to the 
subject matter. By humanizing the participants, contextualizing the issues, and 
considering the alternatives, Driver forces the reader to measure the Court’s 
cases not just against the reader’s own perspective and bias but against reality. 
This makes it all but impossible to leave these cases without changing one’s 
view a little—or at least acknowledging that the cases are too complex to have 
full confidence in any single perspective. 
C. The Cutting-Room Floor 
The doctrinal breadth and narrative depth of The Schoolhouse Gate, howev-
er, also come at a cost. Synthesizing the cases into a comprehensive metanarra-
tive makes the book widely accessible but requires leaving out some analytical 
threads and cases that are worth exploring. Driver can only devote so much at-
tention to any single issue or case. As a result, the cases and the legal issues get 
roughly equal treatment. This may make the relative treatment of a few cases 
jump out for some readers. 
 
54. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 81-84. 
55. Id. at 201 (citing William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 564 (1992)). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 88-91. He backs up this conclusion with lower-court decisions that were more aggres-
sive prior to Tinker. 
58. See supra note 52. 
59. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 91. 
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Take San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
60
 which ranks 
among the Supreme Court’s most important education cases. The Schoolhouse 
Gate devotes thirteen pages to the case, roughly the same number of pages it 
devotes to Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia,
61
 a case which few—
including many scholars—have heard of. While Vorchheimer involved the high-
ly controversial operation of a male-only public high school, the Supreme 
Court failed to reach a decision in the case, evenly splitting four-to-four.
62
 
Driver discusses Vorchheimer to emphasize what can happen when the Court 
fails to decide an important issue,
63
 a point well taken. Single-sex education 
persisted and has even seen periods of expansion.
64
 But more important are 
two more recent cases, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan
65
 and United 
States v. Virginia,
66
 that severely restricted single-sex education.
67
 These cases, 
however, understandably do not make an appearance in the book because they 
arise in the context of higher education. 
Driver’s treatment of Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding
68
 is 
similarly striking.
69
 The case does not add much to the canon of education doc-
trine. In it, the Court held that the strip search of a middle-school girl was un-
 
60. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
61. 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (per curiam). 
62. Id. at 703. The lower court had upheld the policy and the Court’s failure to reach a decision 
acted as a practical affirmance. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 532 F.2d 880, 881 (3d Cir. 
1976), aff’d by an equally divided court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). 
63. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 333 (describing the case as an “institutional obligation [that] re-
mains unfulfilled”); id. at 339-40 (discussing the continuing debate over the “legitimacy of 
single-sex public schools”). 
64. J. Shaw Vanze, The Constitutionality of Single-Sex Public Education in Pennsylvania Elementary 
and Secondary Schools, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1479, 1480 (2010) (discussing the increase in 
single-sex education notwithstanding the Court’s holding in United States v. Virginia, 518 
U.S. 515 (1996)). 
65. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
66. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
67. Justice Scalia lamented in his Virginia dissent that “[u]nder the constitutional principles an-
nounced and applied today, single-sex public education is unconstitutional” or, at best, 
“functionally dead.” Id. at 595-96 (Scalia, J. dissenting). For an analysis of whether the 
Court’s decision did portend the end of single-sex public education, see Kimberly J. Jenkins, 
Constitutional Lessons for the Next Generation of Public Single-Sex Elementary and Secondary 
Schools, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1953 (2006). 
68. 557 U.S. 364 (2009). 
69. See DRIVER, supra note 1, at 219-30. 
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reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
70
 From the Court’s perspective, it 
did little more than apply a twenty-year-old basic rule to a troubling set of 
facts
71
—not the sort of thing the Supreme Court normally does. Driver appears 
to include it, not because it involves groundbreaking doctrine, but because it 
provides a vivid example of how far school districts have gone in their authori-
tarian approach to school discipline.
72
 
But at the same time, The Schoolhouse Gate does not discuss some seminal 
desegregation cases like Freeman v. Pitts
73
 and Missouri v. Jenkins,
74
 which are 
worth mentioning here. Freeman v. Pitts effectively ended school desegregation 
that was otherwise occurring across the South and elsewhere. First, the Court 
held that schools did not have to eliminate all the vestiges of discrimination be-
fore courts could begin releasing them of supervision;
75
 it was enough if 
schools had eliminated the vestiges in some particular aspects of their opera-
tions.
76
 Second, the Court articulated what amounted to an affirmative defense 
to the continuing duty to desegregate. Under Freeman, schools need only show 
that demographic shifts had contributed to segregation in the district.
77
 This 
was enough to shift the burden back onto plaintiffs
78
—plaintiffs who had in 
those cases already established de jure segregation. This burden-shifting was 
devastating for plaintiffs,
79
 as the mere passage of time inevitably produces 
 
70. Redding, 557 U.S. at 379 (“The strip search of Savana Redding was unreasonable and a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment . . . .”). 
71. Id. at 375 (“The indignity of the search . . . implicate[s] the rule of reasonableness as stated 
in [New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985),] that ‘the search as actually conducted [be] 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place.’”). 
72. For numerous examples of the egregious lengths to which schools have gone, the data to 
support it as a systematic problem, and a potential constitutional response, see DEREK W. 
BLACK, ENDING ZERO TOLERANCE: THE CRISIS OF ABSOLUTE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE (2016). 
73. 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
74. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
75. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 471 (indicating that the district court could grant partial unitary status). 
76. Id. (“A district court need not retain active control over every aspect of school administration 
until a school district has demonstrated unitary status in all facets of its system.”). 
77. Id. at 494 (“[T]he school district is under no duty to remedy imbalance that is caused by 
demographic factors.”). 
78. Id. (“[I]n the absence of a showing that either the school authorities or some other agency 
of the State has deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial 
composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court should not be necessary.” 
(quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971))). 
79. Bradley W. Joondeph, Note, Killing Brown Softly: The Subtle Undermining of Effective Deseg-
regation in Freeman v. Pitts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 147 (1993). 
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demographic changes and, thus, the basis for districts to escape their duty to 
desegregate.
80
 
Missouri v. Jenkins
81
 addressed the other part of what was left of school de-
segregation. In those districts in which the physical integration of schools was 
not possible, courts had long ordered states and districts to fund school-
improvement programs.
82
 In Jenkins, the Court required plaintiffs to justify the 
continuation of those programs with evidence so precise that it is practically 
impossible to supply. Plaintiffs would, for instance, need to demonstrate the 
extent to which current achievement gaps are traceable to prior de jure segrega-
tion.
83
 Having announced an immediately available defense to school desegre-
gation in Freeman and a huge evidentiary barrier to school improvement in Jen-
kins, courts rapidly dissolved school-desegregation cases across the country.
84
 
Taken together, Jenkins and Freeman were so consequential that it is hard to im-
agine that the Court will ever hear another mandatory school-desegregation 
case. 
There are no perfect answers to the questions about what one includes in or 
excludes from a book. In most ways, The Schoolhouse Gate is a resounding suc-
cess. Driver writes in an engaging, narrative style that covers much of the 
Court’s education docket. He puts readers in the position to interpret and 
judge the Court for themselves rather than rely on others’ biased points of 
view. He proves that the Supreme Court has made a significant difference—for 
good or bad—in the nation’s largest governmental institution. But one signifi-
cant narrative left out of the book is a sustained interrogation of the right to 
education, which we provide below. 
 
80. Id. at 162 (“Freeman significantly increases the possibility that, despite years of judicial su-
pervision, school districts will never truly desegregate.”). 
81. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
82. That authority flowed from the Court’s holding in Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
83. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 102 (“Just as demographic changes independent of de jure segregation 
will affect the racial composition of student assignments, so too will numerous external fac-
tors beyond the control of the [Kansas City, Missouri School District] and the State affect 
minority student achievement. So long as these external factors are not the result of segrega-
tion, they do not figure in the remedial calculus.” (citation omitted)). 
84. See, e.g., NAACP v. Duval Cty. Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 965 (11th Cir. 2001) (discussing the low-
er-court decision in the early 1990s finding that the district had met its constitutional obli-
gations); Lockett v. Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 839, 841 (11th Cir. 1997) (same); see also Gary Or-
field & Chungmei Lee, Historic Reversals, Accelerating Resegregation, and the Need for New 
Integration Strategies, C.R. PROJECT 5 (Aug. 2007), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu
/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/historic-reversals-accelerating 
-resegregation-and-the-need-for-new-integration-strategies-1/orfield-historic-reversals 
-accelerating.pdf [https://perma.cc/58JT-RSXR]. 
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i i .  the right to education  
The most basic, complex, and potentially consequential issue in education 
law is whether students have a right to education. In four of the Court’s most 
important education cases—Brown v. Board of Education,
85
 San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez,
86
 Goss v. Lopez,
87
 and Plyler v. Doe
88
—the 
right to education is directly implicated. Driver acknowledges the importance 
of these cases and, interestingly, seeks to elevate Plyler.
89
 Indeed, Driver charac-
terizes the Court’s opinion in Plyler as one of “the most egalitarian, momen-
tous, and efficacious constitutional opinions that the Supreme Court has issued 
throughout its entire history.”
90
 
The scope of The Schoolhouse Gate, however, requires that Driver’s treat-
ment of these cases focuses on their facts and the narrow grounds upon which 
they were decided. His effort to construct a narrative of the Court, its members, 
and the evolution in the Court’s thinking across time understandably precludes 
him from probing the larger theoretical aspects that we elicit here. Yet there 
remains a contradiction in the Court’s own narrative. For nearly a century, the 
Court has consistently acknowledged the special place that education holds in 
our democratic structure.
91
 But the Court refused to recognize the doctrinal 
implications of that status and the possibility that students have a right to pub-
lic education.
92
 A key question thus remains unanswered: why has the Court 
failed to ensure equal educational opportunity? 
This Part explores this and related issues through the most prominent Su-
preme Court decisions touching on the right to education in three Sections. 
The first Section examines the Court’s rejection of a fundamental right to edu-
cation in San Antonio v. Rodriguez. It emphasizes that the Court’s holding was 
inconsistent with the lofty status Brown v. Board of Education had afforded edu-
 
85. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
86. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
87. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
88. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
89. Jill Lepore was the first to notice and emphasize the important work Driver was doing on 
Plyler. See Jill Lepore, Is Education a Fundamental Right?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 10, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/10/is-education-a-fundamental-right 
[https://perma.cc/S6KQ-6PN2]. 
90. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 316. 
91. See supra note 17. 
92. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1973) (rejecting education 
as a fundamental right); see also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) 
(confirming Rodriguez on that point). 
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cation and also created a number of practical and doctrinal challenges for the 
future. One of them was the basis upon which the Court might intervene in 
other egregious denials of educational opportunity. The second Section ex-
plores this intervention problem through Goss v. Lopez, a school suspension 
case. Having rejected education as a fundamental right in Rodriguez, the Court 
had to identify some statutory right to education that schools could not simply 
take away at their discretion. The third Section explores a similar problem in 
Plyler v. Doe. While Texas had clearly targeted undocumented students for ex-
clusion from school, the Court’s prior decision in Rodriguez dictated that the 
state need only justify educational inequality under rational basis review. Thus, 
the Court again struggled to articulate the logic upon which it would intervene. 
A. San Antonio v. Rodriguez: School Funding’s Impact on the Right to 
Education 
1. Implications Well Beyond Money 
In Rodriguez, the Court infamously announced that education is not a fun-
damental right
93
 and that poverty is not a suspect class triggering heightened 
scrutiny.
94
 Thus, the Court only applied rational basis review to the egregious 
funding disparities between school districts.
95
 Driver frames his discussion of 
the case almost entirely around its facts. He writes that Rodriguez was about 
school-funding practices that “yielded massive disparities in per pupil expendi-
tures between areas with high property values and areas with low property val-
ues.”
96
 Driver describes Rodriguez as a technical case about “tax dollars,” the 
“intricacies and uncertainties of school financing,”
97
 and the “desirability of 
school-financing reform.”
98
 He also attempts to put a silver lining on the case 
by noting that advocates can still turn to state courts and state law for reme-
dies. He tells the reader: “[E]ven if federal courts prove initially hostile to 
 
93. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35 (“Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit 
protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicit-
ly so protected.”). 
94. Id. at 29 (“[T]his Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides 
an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny.”). 
95. Id. at 55 (“The constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause is whether the 
challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest. We hold that 
the Texas plan abundantly satisfies this standard.” (citation omitted)). 
96. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 315. 
97. Id. at 319. 
98. Id. 
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rights claims under the federal Constitution, reformers can attain victories at 
least sometimes by invoking state constitutional provisions.”
99
 
But it is worth noting that the contrary opinion, expressed by Justice Mar-
shall, may be the better one—that the case was a massive blow to educational 
rights. Writing in dissent, Marshall framed the case as one about the “quality 
of education [the state] offers its children.”
100
 The Court’s holding, he argued, 
was “an abrupt departure” from precedent and “a retreat from our historic 
commitment to equality of educational opportunity.”
101
 Now, the state will be 
free to “depriv[e] children in their earliest years of the chance to reach their full 
potential as citizens.”
102
 
In a closing paragraph, Driver optimistically notes a recent Michigan law-
suit that takes up the question left open in Rodriguez—whether depriving stu-
dents of even a minimally basic education might violate students’ constitution-
al right to education.
103
 But as Justice Marshall’s dissent reveals, the 
constitutional right to an education—more particularly, the equal educational 
opportunities it demands—has been the question since the beginning. The is-
sue arises in Michigan because the Court skirted it in Rodriguez. 
Driver is not the first to label Rodriguez and the state litigation it spawned 
“school-finance litigation.” But money is simply a means to an end, as state 
courts and leading scholars have recognized.
104
 The right in so-called school-
finance cases is not a right to some specific level or form of school funding. It is 
a right to an adequate or equal education, and such a right can implicate any 
number of issues.
105
 Money is just one. 
 
99. Id. at 316. 
100. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
101. Id. at 70-71. 
102. Id. at 71. 
103. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 329-30. 
104. James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 532 
(1999); see also Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the Consti-
tutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 390 (2012) (“[A]dditional funding is not an 
end in and of itself. Funding is relevant only because it can purchase the critical inputs, such 
as teachers and curricula, which are necessary to offer students an equal educational oppor-
tunity or some qualitative level of education.”); Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. 
Board of Education: Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1355-56 
(2004); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 307-10 (1999); Christo-
pher E. Adams, Comment, Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in School Finance Litiga-
tion?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613, 1642 (2007). 
105. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211-12 (Ky. 1989) (holding that 
the state constitution “requires the General Assembly to establish a system of common 
schools that provides an equal opportunity for children to have an adequate education,” that 
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At its core, school-finance litigation—whether under the rubric of adequacy 
or equity—concerns the constitutional right to education and its qualitative 
scope.
106
 Plaintiffs’ primary substantive complaint is that shortcomings in 
teacher quality, class size, student learning, graduation rates, curriculum, or ac-
ademic standards reveal a deprivation of educational opportunity.
107
 This 
broad understanding of the constitutionally required educational opportunity 
has allowed plaintiffs to challenge almost any education policy or resource that 
interferes with equity, adequacy, and access.
108
 Sheff v. O’Neill, a seminal case 
striking down school segregation under the Connecticut Constitution, offers a 
perfect example of how these rights span beyond money.
109
 In Sheff, the court 
held that the state had an “affirmative constitutional obligation to provide a 
substantially equal educational opportunity” and “extreme racial and ethnic 
isolation,” regardless of equalized school funding, “deprives schoolchildren” of 
their constitutional rights.
110
 
These cases are not mere consolation prizes but rather they reveal how 
much was at stake—and how much was lost—in Rodriguez. When the Court 
rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to school-funding inequity in Texas, the Court re-
jected the fundamental right to education and every aspect of learning and eq-
uity that it touches. The Court’s holding appeared so momentous that the ma-
jority qualified its approach, allowing that plaintiffs’ claim might have 
“merit . . . if a State’s financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educa-
tional opportunities to any of its children” or “fail[ed] to provide each child 
with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the en-
joyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political pro-
 
the state had failed in that duty, and that the state had to “recreate” and “redesign” its entire 
education system). 
106. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995) (“That 
Article requires the State to offer all children the opportunity of a sound basic education. 
Such an education should consist of the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary 
to enable children to eventually function productively as civic participants capable of voting 
and serving on a jury.” (citations omitted)). 
107. See, e.g., Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 169-73 (S.C. 2014) (examining 
transportation, teachers, and district size); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 
N.E.2d 326, 333-36 (N.Y. 2003) (evaluating teachers, facilities, and the instrumentalities of 
learning). 
108. Derek W. Black, Reforming School Discipline, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2016) (explaining 
the basic logic and specific challenges to segregation, teacher tenure, charter-school caps, 
and school discipline under education clauses). 
109. 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996). 
110. Id. at 1281. 
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cess.”
111
 This type of distinction is often the work of dissenters seeking to limit 
a negative decision, not the pronouncement of a majority. 
2. Decades of Scholarly Outrage 
As discussed above, The Schoolhouse Gate probes contemporary and subse-
quent scholarship as a measure of an opinion’s significance. With Rodriguez, 
Driver quotes two scholars who immediately affirmed the result and discusses 
Goodwin Liu’s more recent argument that Congress has the authority to inter-
vene in funding inequality even if the Court will not.
112
 But the literature on 
the right to education is particularly voluminous and extremely critical of the 
Court. While it is beyond the scope of Driver’s project to detail that literature, 
it worth more discussion for our purposes. 
Mark Yudof’s early autopsy of Rodriguez is instructive.
113
 He charged the 
Court with casting aside doctrinal “analysis of equal educational opportuni-
ty . . . in favor of a focus on the appropriate judicial role, the limits on judicial 
manageability, and the dictates of public policy.”
114
 Yudof emphasized that the 
precise doctrinal question was whether to “declare[] education to be constitu-
tionally fundamental.”
115
 But the Court’s analysis on that question was neither 
full nor fair. Rather than seriously entertain the key constitutional issues, the 
Court rested its decision on the uncertainty regarding the impact of relative 
differences in per-pupil expenditures.
116
 Yudof predicted that the “Court’s un-
willingness to treat education with . . . solicitude . . . may have grave conse-
quences” in a variety of education cases having little if anything to do with in-
terdistrict disparities in school funding.
117
 Yudof was correct. Fifteen years 
later, for instance, the Court would rely on Rodriguez in upholding school-bus 
 
111. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973). 
112. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 326-27; Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 
116 YALE L.J. 330 (2006). Driver’s footnotes include some additional citations, but they are 
directed at the efficacy of school finance. 
113. Mark G. Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEX. L. REV. 411 (1973). 
114. Id. at 503. 
115. Id. 
116. The Court rejected plaintiffs’ claims “because the majority—or at least Mr. Justice Powell—
did not believe that the requisite degree of injury had been established where the State alleg-
edly provided a minimum educational opportunity.” Id. at 503-04. 
117. Id. at 503. Yudof pointed to “intradistrict resource disparities, school exclusions, and ability 
grouping practices.” Id. 
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fees, even for distant families with incomes “near the officially defined poverty 
level.”
118
 
The scholarly criticism of Rodriguez has continued ever since. For instance, 
a decade after Yudof’s critique, Gershon Ratner argued that standards-based 
reform had shown that qualitative tools can be developed to evaluate and com-
pare districts.
119
 The advent of those standards, Ratner argued, imposes a con-
stitutional duty on every urban public school to educate “the vast majority of 
its students, regardless of the proportions of poor and minority students,” with 
“basic skills.”
120
 More recently, one of us has argued that “every predicate upon 
which the Court made its decision has changed,” including state-court prece-
dent, which has shown “educational rights [to be] inapposite to the Court’s 
characterizations in Rodriguez.”
121
 As late as 2015, Charles Ogletree and Kim-
berly Robinson edited a volume devoted solely to critiquing Rodriguez and  
theorizing options for counteracting it.
122
 Scholars have so dutifully obsessed 
over the case that Joshua Weishart—a full forty-five years after Rodriguez—
aptly dubbed Derek Black’s 2018 attempt to reconceptualize the constitutional 
foundations of the right to education as something akin to the quest for the 
Holy Grail—a quest that “has captured the imagination of the likes of Erwin 
Chemerinsky and Cass Sunstein, among scores of other scholars.”
123
 
3. Imagining an Alternative Outcome 
Driver could not fairly be expected to exercise his skilled touch in spinning 
alternate scenarios and hypotheticals for every case discussed in the book. Yet it 
is particularly illuminating to deploy Driver’s method to Rodriguez here. The 
alternative universe in which the Court would have recognized a fundamental 
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right to education seemed plausible, if not likely, in 1973. Prior to the Court’s 
decision, several signs pointed toward the Court ruling in favor of the plain-
tiffs. The federal district court had held that education was a fundamental 
right.
124
 State supreme courts were also entertaining school-funding cases that 
implicated state and federal fundamental rights to education. Both the Califor-
nia and New Jersey Supreme Courts had already concluded that education was 
a fundamental right under the state and federal constitutions.
125
 
Most importantly, the Court’s school-desegregation precedent, as well as a 
number of other liberty cases, suggested that the recognition of a right to edu-
cation was just around the corner. In Brown v. Board of Education,
126
 for in-
stance, the Court came close to recognizing a fundamental right. It stated that 
education is “perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments”—an “opportunity” which “must be made available to all on equal 
terms.”
127
 Bolling v. Sharpe
128
—the companion case to Brown that dealt with 
segregation in Washington, D.C.— might have gone even further.
129
 Chief Jus-
tice Warren’s initial draft of the opinion declared education to be “a fundamen-
tal liberty” and struck down school segregation as “an arbitrary deprivation of 
[that] liberty.”
130
 The Court ultimately decided Brown and Bolling based on 
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ty, but this shift created an obvious problem that remains in Bolling to this day. Without a 
fundamental right vested in liberty—a term that does appear in the Fifth Amendment—the 
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equal protection principles, but that rationale was primarily to ensure a unani-
mous opinion.
131
 The cases clearly laid the ideological foundations of a right to 
education. Leading advocates and scholars such as the late Derrick Bell have ar-
gued that the Court simply needed the right facts to build on that founda-
tion.
132
 
An alternative universe in which Rodriguez recognized a right to education 
ultimately would have rewritten both school-finance history and the entirety of 
the struggle for equal educational opportunity. This is not to say federal inter-
vention is without downsides. Federal intervention would have cut short the 
experimental and evolving common law development of the right to education 
that eventually occurred in state courts. That trial-and-error approach has cer-
tainly produced some benefits that might not have occurred otherwise.
133
 But 
on the whole, federal intervention would have brought three positive develop-
ments. 
First, a federal right to education would have secured uniform rights. State 
litigation thus far has produced uneven results and plaintiffs only have viable 
state constitutional claims in just over half of the states.
134
 States like Illinois, 
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Florida’s courts have also rejected constitutional education claims several times notwith-
standing troubling education inequalities. See Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Fund-
ing, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam). In contrast, South Caroli-
na’s constitution simply provides that the General Assembly “shall provide for the 
 
equality of opportunity and the schoolhouse gate 
2327 
Georgia, and Florida have thus far entirely precluded school-funding challeng-
es
135
 and unsurprisingly have experienced relatively high levels of funding in-
adequacy or inequality.
136
 Courts in North Carolina and South Carolina have 
recognized a right to education,
137
 but have struggled to force their legislatures 
to adopt meaningful remedies for deprivations of education.
138
 Only one state 
has managed to both recognize education rights and consistently enforce them 
over an extended period of time.
139
 
Second, a federal right would have improved the enforcement of education 
rights. Even prevailing state-court plaintiffs struggle to secure effective reme-
dies.
140
 Separation-of-powers principles, the election of state-court judges, and 
recalcitrant legislatures all constrain the judiciary’s ability to remedy constitu-
tional education violations.
141
 Federal courts do not operate under those same 
 
maintenance and support of a system of free public schools,” S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3, but its 
supreme court has twice sided with plaintiffs in challenges to the quality and funding of ed-
ucation in the state. Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157 (S.C. 2014), amended by 
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/abbott-v-burke/abbott-history.html [https://perma.cc/NNZ9-G9BB] (discussing the his-
tory of the litigation in New Jersey). 
140. See generally Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational 
Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701 (2010) (re-
viewing the different approaches that state courts have taken to adjudicating and remediat-
ing education-adequacy cases). 
141. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (“It is [the 
General Assembly’s] decision how best to achieve efficiency.”); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 
Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 58 (N.Y. 2006) (“[I]n fashioning specific remedies for constitu-
tional violations, we must avoid intrusion on the primary domain of another branch of gov-
ernment.”); Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 261 (“[T]he administration of the public schools of the 
state is best left to the legislative and executive branches of government. Therefore, the 
courts of the state must grant every reasonable deference to the legislative and executive 
branches when considering whether they have established and are administering 
a . . . sound basic education.”); Derek W. Black, Averting Educational Crisis: Funding Cuts, 
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limitations. Federal courts are far from perfect, but school desegregation re-
veals that they have the capacity to take over school systems and enforce educa-
tion reform.
142
 
Third, had the Court recognized a federal right to education, it would have 
expanded congressional power to guarantee educational equity and adequacy. 
Currently, Congress’s only power to promote general educational improve-
ments and equity comes from the Spending Clause. It has used this power to 
pass and fund legislation such as the No Child Left Behind Act
143
 and the Every 
Student Succeeds Act.
144
 But statutes passed pursuant to the Spending Clause 
allow states to refuse to participate in federal programs.
145
 This limits Con-
gress’s ability to require states to reform their education practices. On the other 
hand, if Rodriguez had recognized education as a fundamental right, it would 
be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Because Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment grants Congress power to enforce the Amendment’s sub-
stantive provisions, Congress could have required states to remedy educational 
inadequacies and inequities.
146
 When using its Section 5 powers, Congress 
need not cajole or bribe states.
147
 Instead, it can demand that states come into 
compliance with the substantive provisions of the Amendment and allow indi-
vidual plaintiffs to sue recalcitrant states in federal court to ensure compliance 
if they do not. 
Perhaps the fear of this alternate universe was what drove the Court away 
from recognizing a fundamental right to education. Yet fear is insufficient as a 
sole explanatory factor. Responding to general critiques of judicial intervention 
in schools, Driver astutely recognizes that intervention concerns are often over-
stated.
148
 The Court has intervened in many controversial education issues. 
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423, 456 (2016) (discussing legislatures that had defied court orders). 
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Thus, the better reading seems to be that the Court intervenes whenever it 
wants to and laments the dangers of intervention when it is disinclined to do 
so.
149
 Regardless, the consequences of nonintervention in Rodriguez could not 
have been more significant. Those consequences shaped much of the most im-
portant state and federal education litigation that followed it. 
B. Goss v. Lopez: Suspension as a Deprivation of a Right to Education 
Goss v. Lopez
150
 shows yet again how the right to education links the 
Court’s school cases. The case involved a state statute that permitted schools to 
summarily suspend students without any sort of process.
151
 The Court struck 
down the statute, holding that students are entitled to due process prior to sus-
pension.
152
 The case also, however, has two vital links to the right to education 
beyond due process and a school-discipline dispute. First, note how Goss is part 
of Brown’s progeny. As schools began to integrate, racial bias and discrimina-
tion began to manifest themselves in school discipline.
153
 Driver does an excel-
lent job teasing out this part of the story. He devotes an entire subsection to 
explaining why Goss “should not be mistaken for an insignificant opinion.”
154
 
He argues that Goss was part of the “march toward racial equality” and a failure 
to intervene would have been a “conspicuous” “snub to the cause.”
155
 His tell-
ing of the story implicitly substantiates our thesis that the right to equal educa-
tional opportunity is a central aspect of the Court’s education precedent. 
Second, Goss confronted the issue that Brown avoided and Rodriguez did not 
fully resolve—the existence and nature of a right to education. Had the Court 
in either of those cases recognized a right to education, Goss would have been 
an easy case for the plaintiffs to win.
156
 But that was a road not taken. Instead, 
it was the school district that argued that the outcome was preordained: 
“[B]ecause there is no constitutional right to an education at public expense, 
the Due Process Clause does not protect against expulsions from the public 
 
149. Id. 
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151. Id. at 567. 
152. Id. 
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154. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 157. 
155. Id. at 157-58. 
156. Goss may have not even made it to the Supreme Court, as due process would have clearly 
attached to school actions that sought to take away a student’s fundamental right to educa-
tion. 
the yale law journal 128:2302  2019 
2330 
school system.”
157
 Thus, the Court in Goss confronted a tough choice: rule 
against the plaintiffs and ignore the blatant unfairness occurring in school dis-
cipline or identify some right that triggers due process but does not implicate a 
fundamental right to education. 
Pursing the latter option, the Court characterized education as a property 
interest and found that property in a strange place—Ohio’s compulsory-
attendance law.
158
 The Court reasoned that the combination of schools’ statu-
tory duty “to provide a free education” and students’ statutory requirement to 
attend those schools created a property interest or “legitimate claims of enti-
tlement to a public education.”
159
 School suspensions and expulsions amount 
to attempts to take that property interest away, requiring due process.
160
 The 
dissent responded with confusion: “[T]he very legislation [that the majority 
relies on to] ‘defin[e]’ the ‘dimension’ of the student’s entitlement . . . does not 
establish this right free of discipline imposed.”
161
 To the contrary, “the right is 
encompassed in the entire package of statutory provisions governing education 
in Ohio—of which the power to suspend is one.”
162
 In other words, an educa-
tion statute that gives schools the authority to suspend students without any 
due process is a strange place to locate a property right. 
Goss shows how the right to education is inescapable in education cases. 
First, in attempting to skirt the constitutional issue of a right to education, the 
Court simply triggered statutory-interpretation squabbles on the same general 
subject. This game is not worth the candle because statutory rights in educa-
tion do not operate independently of constitutional rights to education. The 
Court simplistically and incorrectly ignored this connection when it wrote that 
“[a]lthough Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated to establish and main-
tain a public school system, it has [by statute] nevertheless done so and has re-
quired its children to attend.”
163
 A simple reading of Ohio’s constitution reveals 
the flaw. The Ohio Constitution provides that “the general assembly shall make 
such provisions . . . as . . . will secure a thorough and efficient system of com-
 
157. Goss, 419 U.S. at 572. 
158. The Court also indicated that students have a liberty interest in their reputation that suspen-
sions tarnish, id. at 575-76, but later cases reject the notion that this type of reputational in-
terest standing alone without some other tangible property interest would trigger due pro-
cess concerns, see, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). 
159. Goss, 419 U.S. at 573-74. 
160. Id. 
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mon schools throughout the State.”
164
 Thus, the provision of public education 
is no mere voluntary legislative act. It is a constitutional duty. This constitu-
tional duty, not simply the attendance laws enacted pursuant to that duty, im-
plies an individual right to education. 
Second, Ohio’s constitution is not unique. All fifty state constitutions re-
quire their governments to provide for public education.
165
 This makes the 
Court’s obfuscation all the more glaring and raises a crucial question: why are 
education clauses uniformly present in state constitutions? The answer, one of 
us has argued, is that these clauses exist and coalesce around common concepts 
because they are an effectuation of the U.S. Constitution itself.
166
 The end of 
the Civil War raised two constitutional issues—the meaning of a republican 
form of government and the rights of citizens in such a government. The ratifi-
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the readmission of southern states to 
the Union resolved these issues. Ratification and readmission established edu-
cation both as a right of citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
and as a central pillar, alongside the right to vote, of a republican form of gov-
ernment.
167
 The most persuasive evidence for this conclusion is that Congress 
by statute explicitly conditioned the readmission of the final three confederate 
states on their education clauses: “[T]he constitution of [the state] shall never 
be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the 
United States of the school rights and privileges secured by the constitution of 
said State.”
168
 Moreover, after 1870, no state would ever again enter into the 
Union without an education clause in its state constitution.
169
 
This deeper analysis, which eluded the Court, is directly relevant to a host 
of additional issues—issues that cannot be fairly resolved without a full appre-
ciation of the right to education. Most notably, a constitutional right to educa-
tion triggers a different due process response than a statutory property right.
170
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concerned); Phillip Leon M. ex rel. J.P.M. v. Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 
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education guaranteed in its constitution); In re RM, 102 P.3d 868, 873 (Wyo. 2004) (same). 
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The deprivation of a constitutional right requires more than just minimal due 
process.
171
 Errors that might be acceptable in the context of a property right are 
likely intolerable in the context of a sacrosanct constitutional right.
172
 Second, 
as some state-court decisions have indicated, a constitutional right requires a 
school to justify suspensions and expulsions with important or compelling in-
terests.
173
 In other words, expelling a student for relatively minor misbehavior 
is unjustifiable when access to education is recognized as a constitutional right. 
Likewise, even when the school has an important or compelling reason for ex-
cluding a student, the existence of a constitutional right would require the 
school to first explore less restrictive alternatives.
174
 
Finally, by reducing the case to an issue of statutory property rights, the 
Court in Goss may not have actually provided any meaningful protection to 
students subject to suspension and expulsion. Over time, basic due process has 
evolved into little more than perfunctory box-checking as schools execute their 
preordained decision to exclude a student.
175
 Rather than requiring schools to 
justify exclusion as serving a state interest proportionate to or more important 
than the harm imposed on the student, exclusions are viewed as justified so 
long as a student has been put on notice of their misbehavior.
176
 This question-
able standard made the movement toward zero tolerance possible.
177
 Addition-
ally, Goss’s problematic framing continues to influence the way that state courts 
approach school discipline.
178
 In sum, the aftermath of Goss offers just one 
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176. See id. at 847. 
177. See, e.g., Ratner v. Loudoun Cty. Pub. Sch., 16 F. App’x 140, 141 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding 
the expulsion of a student who technically violated a zero-tolerance policy on weapons when 
he took a weapon from his suicidal friend because the district had afforded the student all 
the process that Goss required). Driver also laments zero-tolerance policies but does not fo-
cus on how the Court’s doctrinal and theoretical flaws create the problem. DRIVER, supra 
note 1, at 158-65. 
178. Students’ chances of succeeding in challenging suspension and expulsion are low and have 
fallen further over time, although students’ chances are ironically better in state court than 
in federal court due to additional statutory protections that states sometimes provide. 
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L. REV. 353, 381 (2008). 
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more example of how the Court’s failure to take the right to education seriously 
has far-reaching and negative consequences. 
C. Plyler v. Doe: The Unavoidable Tension Between Access and the Right to 
Education 
Two years after the Court’s decision in Rodriguez, Texas passed legislation 
barring undocumented children from enrolling in and attending public 
school.
179
 In Plyler v. Doe,
180
 the Court struck down that legislation. Plyler has 
been the subject of many competing scholarly theories and narratives.
181
 The 
Schoolhouse Gate is extremely impressive here. Almost four decades after the 
fact, Driver offers a new interpretation of the case and its context. Driver 
demonstrates that Plyler was forward-thinking, not an idiosyncratic one-off. 
Framed this way, he forcefully argues that the Court’s opinion in Plyler is one 
of its most influential. 
Driver’s rationale is compelling. He explains how the Court resolved a new 
problem quickly before it could spread.
182
 For Driver, the proper measure of a 
case’s impact is not just what it overturns or rebukes but also what it prevents 
from ever happening. Had the Court permitted Texas’s exclusion of undocu-
mented students, history strongly suggests that other states would have repli-
cated the policy.
183
 But because the Court took bold early action, it shaped the 
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course of history. Outside of “prominent right-leaning commentators [who] 
assail the opinion as a lawless aggrandizement of judicial authority,”
184
 Plyler 
has remained well-settled law for over three decades. Even as anti-immigrant 
sentiments have recently grown, Plyler has operated as a clear and relatively un-
controversial bulwark against efforts to indirectly exclude undocumented stu-
dents.
185
 From this perspective, the incredible influence of the Court’s decision 
renders its success invisible. 
At the same time, Plyler highlights the Court’s uneasiness with its prior re-
jection and obfuscation of the right to education—a point that Driver does not 
take up. Based on existing precedent establishing rational basis review,
186
 the 
plaintiffs’ chance of success in Plyler was, at best, extremely low. Under rational 
basis review, the state could certainly articulate a legitimate government pur-
pose, such as saving costs and improving other students’ education.
187
 Exclud-
ing undocumented students would marginally further those goals.
188
 The per-
niciousness of the legislation, however, laid bare that the Court’s prior 
decisions had trapped it in an understanding of public education with trou-
bling implications. As the Court itself wrote in Plyler, education is not a consti-
tutional right, but “neither is it merely some governmental ‘benefit’ indistin-
guishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.”
189
 Yet no majority 
existed to overturn Rodriguez or announce a new doctrine that would limit the 
case’s impact. This tension helps explain the curious reasoning in Plyler. 
First, the Court recounted laudatory characterizations of education from 
several other cases. The language it selected is the type normally reserved for 
fundamental rights: education is of “supreme importance” to the nation, “most 
vital [in] . . . the preservation of a democratic system of government,” and nec-
essary for individuals to “participate effectively and intelligently in our open 
 
.com/2015/02/19/nyregion/new-york-compels-20-school-districts-to-lower-barriers-to 
-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/73XX-JSWD]. 
184. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 358. 
185. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 183. 
186. Per Rodriguez, education is not a fundamental right; thus, the law would only trigger ration-
al basis review. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). Similarly, 
immigration status is not a suspect classification; thus, rational basis review still applies. See 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982). 
187. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 209. 
188. Id. at 248-51 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Perry, supra note 181, at 338. 
189. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221. 
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political system” and lead “economically productive lives.”
190
 The Court’s 
point, it seemed, was to isolate Rodriguez as aberrational without actually over-
turning or challenging its doctrine. Second, it created wiggle room within ex-
isting doctrine. The Court acknowledged that rational basis review applied, but 
emphasized that “we would not be faithful to our obligations under the Four-
teenth Amendment if we applied so deferential a standard to every classifica-
tion.”
191
 The facts in Plyler, it reasoned, justified less deference because the 
state had taken action “inconsistent with elemental constitutional princi-
ples.”
192
 The Court neither explained these elemental principles nor the mean-
ing of its reduced deference, but the Court in mercurial fashion indicated that it 
would seek “assurance that the classification reflects a reasoned judgment con-
sistent with the ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be 
viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the State.”
193
 
These two steps, the Court reasoned, justified striking down the legislation, 
but they also produced an opinion lacking any clear neutral and replicable prin-
ciple of law—a principle that has long eluded scholars and courts.
194
 The most 
aggressive explanation for the outcome in Plyler is that it rests on a right to 
some minimally adequate educational opportunity. This, of course, is the issue 
that Rodriguez had left open. Thus far, however, Plyler remains entirely limited 
to its facts. Lower courts have refused to apply Plyler’s closer-look review to 
other inequalities and deprivations.
195
 The point here is not to mediate these 
approaches but to emphasize that once again the right to education lies at the 
core of the Court’s most significant cases. Plyler, like the cases that preceded it, 
cannot be fully understood or justified without a theory of the right to educa-
tion. The Court’s convoluted opinion is a direct result of its previous failure to 
 
190. Id. (first quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); then quoting Abington Sch. 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); and then quoting 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)). 
191. Id. at 216. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 217-18. 
194. The case could be read as a hybrid, meaning that when two factors intersect—important 
rights and class-based disadvantage—heavier constitutional scrutiny is appropriate, but the 
Court never specifically articulates that. Or the case could be read as being about one of 
those two factors, but the case does not fully stand on that either. Or, perhaps, it stands on a 
final ground: that the Constitution does guarantee access to a minimally adequate education 
and, because these students had been denied education all together, that right had been 
breached. 
195. See, e.g., Martinez v. Malloy, 350 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D. Conn. 2018); Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. 
Supp. 3d 344 (E.D. Mich. 2018). 
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substantiate a right to education and its current refusal to either revise its doc-
trine or tolerate its logical results. 
i i i .  the right to equal and integrated education  
In the absence of a general constitutional right to education, equal educa-
tional opportunity for minorities has almost exclusively been litigated through 
the Court’s school-desegregation doctrines. In fact, school-desegregation cases 
have consumed far more of the Court’s docket than any other education equity 
issue.
196
 During the late 1960s and for much of the 1970s, the Court issued a 
desegregation opinion almost every year—sometimes more than one.
197
 Those 
cases involved innumerable factual details and generated several nuanced doc-
trines regarding when courts could intervene in school districts and what par-
ticular remedies they could and could not demand. With all that nuance, it is 
tempting to get caught up in the details and lose sight of the forest for the 
trees. But for those seeking to vindicate the rights of African American stu-
dents, these cases were never just about the narrow issue of busing, intentional 
versus de facto segregation, desegregation across school-district lines, resetting 
attendance zones for a particular school, or money; these cases were all about 
securing equal educational opportunity for African Americans—something far 
too long denied.
198
 
Covering this enormous body of law in a single chapter is a herculean task. 
It might even be impossible if one is committed to the three-dimensional story-
telling that Driver so excellently pursues. Richard Kluger, for instance, devoted 
an entire book to the story of Brown.
199
 With far less space, Driver has to make 
tough choices. One is to focus on Swann and Milliken v. Bradley and wrap them 
in the narrative of “busing cases.” But as the following sections will show, these 
cases defy narrow categorization. 
 
196. James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1370, 1363, 1392 
(2000) (examining four decades of educational equity cases and finding desegregation cases 
“are legion” compared to only one due process expulsion case, Goss v. Lopez, and a few fund-
ing-equity cases). 
197. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 157 (4th ed. 2000) (“[In the] 1976 term, 
the Supreme Court had either vacated or remanded orders for system-wide school desegre-
gation plans in four cases.”). 
198. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in 
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). 
199. See KLUGER, supra note 131. 
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A. Parents Involved and the Spirit of Brown 
The core of Driver’s chapter on the Court’s equal protection doctrine as it 
relates to racial segregation in schools is an examination of Brown v. Board of 
Education
200
 and its progeny. Driver observes, correctly, that Brown is open to 
competing interpretations because Chief Justice Warren’s desire for unanimity 
led to an abstractly written opinion.
201
 This explains why Driver bookends the 
chapter with a discussion of Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1.
202
 Driver’s observation that Parents Involved represented 
“the successful culmination of a conservative legal effort, extending back sever-
al decades, to mold and constrain Brown’s meaning” is spot on.
203
 The case fea-
tured one of the greatest battles over constitutional meaning in recent history. 
Squaring off in one corner was Chief Justice Roberts and, in the other, Justice 
Breyer. As Driver reminds the reader, the Chief Justice was relatively new to the 
Court at the time of the decision, and there was some question—given that he 
had disassociated himself from the Federalist Society—as to how he might view 
race-conscious desegregation remedies.
204
 But in Parents Involved, Chief Justice 
Roberts put those questions to rest. 
At issue in Parents Involved were two school districts’ race-based student-
assignment plans. The two school districts recognized that rigidly assigning 
students to schools in their neighborhoods would predictably lead to racially 
segregated schools when the neighborhoods themselves were segregated.
205
 
Seeking to circumvent this, the districts voluntarily decided to use race in their 
student-assignment plans to achieve more racial diversity in their schools. They 
believed their plans paid fealty to Brown.
206
 The argument was sincere. Brown, 
with its emphasis on the importance of equal educational opportunity and its 
admonition that “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal,”
207
 at a 
minimum suggested that school districts had some latitude to use race to 
achieve integration—and arguably required that they do so. But by the time of 
Parents Involved, the question had been transformed into whether exercising 
such discretion violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
200. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
201. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 250-53. 
202. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
203. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 242. 
204. Id. at 296. 
205. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711-13. 
206. Id. at 747 (noting that both parties believed that their position was faithful to Brown). 
207. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
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Writing for a plurality of the Court, the Chief Justice adopted the narrow-
est possible view of Brown’s meaning. As Driver correctly observes, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts adopted a “colorblindness” reading of Brown. For Chief Justice 
Roberts, the student-assignment plans violated both the letter and the spirit of 
Brown. The Chief Justice asked incredulously, “What d[id] the racial classifica-
tions do in [Brown], if not determine admission to a public school on a racial 
basis?”
208
 He opined, “Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they 
could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin.”
209
 Chief Jus-
tice Roberts thought that the problem the Court was trying to solve in Brown 
was the general problem of race-based state statutes (rather than the specific 
race-based segregation of African American students). Such statutes violated 
the Constitution because the Constitution must be “colorblind” (not because 
they disadvantaged African Americans).
210
 From this perspective, the invalidity 
of the student-assignment plans in Parents Involved was an open-and-shut case. 
Driver correctly characterizes Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion as embod-
ying the competing vision of Brown, one that emphasized the importance of ra-
cial integration over segregation, togetherness and belonging over separateness 
and segregation.
211
 Clocking in at over sixty-six pages and extensively review-
ing Supreme Court doctrine, Justice Breyer emphatically rejected the color-
blindness interpretation of Brown.
212
 Justice Breyer focused on the idea of 
“Brown’s promise of integrated primary and secondary education that local 
communities have sought to make a reality.”
213
 Seeking to distinguish the in-
stant case from the Court’s affirmative-action doctrine, Justice Breyer empha-
sized the unique context in which the case arose. Surely local public school dis-
tricts were in the best position to make good on Brown’s promise of 
 
208. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747. 
209. Id. Note Justice Stevens’s terse reply: “There is a cruel irony in The Chief Justice’s reliance 
on our decision in Brown v. Board of Education.” Id. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice 
Stevens continued, “[the Chief Justice’s opinion] states: ‘Before Brown, schoolchildren were 
told where they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin.’ This sen-
tence reminds me of Anatole France’s observation: ‘[T]he majestic equality of the 
la[w], . . . forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to 
steal their bread.’ The Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who 
were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white children struggling to 
attend black schools.” Id. at 799 (citations omitted) (first quoting id. at 747 (majority opin-
ion); and then quoting ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (Winifred Stephens trans., 6th 
ed. 1922)). 
210. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 297. 
211. Id. at 298-99. 
212. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
213. Id. at 803-04. 
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remediating past discrimination and creating a more pluralistic society that had 
tragically gone unfulfilled.
214
 
Driver is at his most effective in explaining how it was that the Chief Justice 
erred. Pushing aside the standard claim that the Roberts’s opinion was “ahis-
torical,” Driver unearths the Chief Justice’s real muse. Roberts’s plaintive cry 
that “history will be heard” did not pay fealty to Brown, Driver argues. Instead, 
Roberts was referencing another, less savory history. He was reasserting views 
held by Brown’s conservative southern opponents. As Driver puts it, “The most 
ringing portions of Roberts’s opinion sound as though they could have been 
ghostwritten by Senator Sam Ervin.”
215
 He puts a finer point on it just a few 
sentences later: “While Roberts’s opinion in Parents Involved identified differ-
ent villains than Ervin did in 1984, the colorblind rhetoric remained exactly the 
same.”
216
 Thus, The Schoolhouse Gate is particularly useful because it demon-
strates that Parents Involved represented the culmination of a decades-long con-
servative legal effort to mold and domesticate Brown’s meaning. 
With the Chief Justice’s approach effectively disqualified, the reader is left 
to ponder whether Justice Breyer or Justice Kennedy had the better of the ar-
gument. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion emphasized that racial diversity 
in K-12 public schools is a constitutionally appropriate goal but one that school 
districts must pursue via (mostly) facially race-neutral means.
217
 It is not clear 
where Driver falls on this, although it does appear that he is somewhat partial 
to Justice Kennedy’s approach as it relies, perhaps inadvertently, on Justice 
Powell’s opinion in Keyes v. School District No. 1.
218
 
Because of the framework of his book, Driver spends more time on the 
differences between the majority and dissent of Parents Involved than on its po-
litical impact. He does note that “[t]he primary obstacle to realizing meaning-
fully integrated schools nowadays comes in the form of not an unbending judi-
ciary but an inert body politic.”
219
 But it is also worth noting here that 
progressive school districts were doing important work to integrate their 
schools before the devastating effects of Parents Involved. While it is true that 
 
214. Id. at 867-68. 
215. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 304. Senator Ervin represented North Carolina and drafted the 
Southern Manifesto, a tract signed by southern legislators condemning Brown. See 102 
CONG. REC. 4459-60 (1956). 
216. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 304. 
217. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
218. 413 U.S. 189, 217-53 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); DRIVER, 
supra note 1, at 301; see also infra notes 260-266 (discussing Keyes). 
219. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 305. 
the yale law journal 128:2302  2019 
2340 
relatively few school districts were pursuing voluntary integration at the time 
the case was decided,
220
 the Supreme Court’s decision cut those few districts 
off at the knees. What is more, the federal courts played a substantial role in 
shutting down race-conscious remedies well before the Court decided Parents 
Involved.
221
 Any movement to integrate schools comes against the background 
of those court decisions. Those decisions have made voluntary desegregation 
extraordinarily difficult. Had the Court in Parents Involved validated the stu-
dent-assignment plans at issue, it would have created a clear exception to that 
background doctrine and removed litigation fears. This could have freed, if not 
incentivized, school districts and other state, local, and federal officials to do 
the hard work of integration. Instead, the Court reinforced a strong disincen-
tive for other districts to voluntarily integrate. 
Finally, striking down community-integration plans is both malignly sym-
bolic and normalizing. From beginning to end, the Court’s school-
desegregation precedent has played a central normalizing function. Its earliest 
cases denormalized segregation and made progress possible. Later cases nor-
malized school-district boundaries and demographic shifts, making resegrega-
tion all but inevitable. In Parents Involved, Roberts’s decision seeks to denor-
malize race consciousness, even for integrative purposes. In doing so, he not 
only makes voluntary integration more difficult as a practical matter, he makes 
it less desirable as an end itself. 
Driver’s discussion of the importance of Brown v. Board of Education spends 
a good deal of time arguing that too much weight is placed on Brown’s una-
nimity.
222
 He argues that the opinion left too many important questions (such 
as whether other types of segregation were prohibited) undecided
223
 and cri-
tiques the view associated with scholars such as Jack Balkin that Brown actually 
represented “an emerging national consensus on racial equality that only the 
South rejected.”
224
 Driver also argues that Brown was more important than 
 
220. James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 132-33 
(2007). 
221. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Arlington Cty. Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999); Wessmann v. Git-
tens, 160 F.3d 790, 791 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 
1996) (striking down the University of Texas School of Law’s tiered race-conscious admis-
sions plan using lower presumptive-admit ranges for black and Mexican American appli-
cants). 
222. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 251-53. 
223. Id. at 250. 
224. Id. at 253; see also Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. 
L. REV. 1537, 1538-39 (2004) (observing that when Brown was decided, a minority of states, 
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many critics have allowed. In assessing Brown’s legacy, Driver emphasizes the 
symbolic value of the opinion. He states, “Brown, properly understood, provid-
ed supporters of racial equality with a powerful rhetorical and moral weapon 
that helped to catalyze the nation toward the goal of racial equality.”
225
 This, 
undoubtedly, is true. After Brown, it was the white segregationists, not black 
activists, not black parents, not black children, who were the constitutional 
outliers.
226
 Brown shifted the defaults and put the U.S. Supreme Court, for a 
time at least, on the right side of history. While Driver emphasizes Brown’s 
symbolic importance, he also reaffirms its substantive significance. An assess-
ment of the Brown implementation cases shows why. 
B. Implementing Brown: “It’s Not the Bus. It’s Us.” 
Driver argues that the familiar critique of Brown v. Board of Education II
227
—
that “all deliberate speed” is oxymoronic—developed long after the decision, 
rather than contemporaneously.
228
 The timing is important because it suggests 
that Brown II (and Brown I before it) might have been more “muscular” than 
they appear to us today. Driver explains that in Brown II, the Court was simply 
recognizing its own limitations. It needed the executive branch to enforce any 
constitutional mandate it might recognize. Thus, it could only go so far in its 
holding. In this way, Driver speaks of Brown II in many of the same ways we 
think of Marbury v. Madison
229
 as a decision that achieved about as much as was 
possible given the political realities on the ground at the time. In this regard as 
in others, The Schoolhouse Gate seeks to make a crucial point that goes well be-
yond education law: looking only at the doctrine gives an incomplete under-
standing of constitutional law. Driver implicitly embeds this point in the very 
structure of the book. He dutifully focuses on the plaintiffs in each case as real 
people and consistently surveys contemporary newspaper accounts and the le-
gal academy’s reaction to the Court’s doctrine. He also grounds each case with-
in a particular political milieu. In all of these ways, Driver attempts to present a 
three-dimensional account of the Supreme Court’s key education cases. 
 
primarily in the South, retained “some version of ‘separate but equal,’” while in “the rest of 
the country . . . de jure segregation had effectively been abolished”). 
225. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 312. 
226. Balkin, supra note 224, at 1541. 
227. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
228. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 256. 
229. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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Of course, Driver cannot explore all of the dynamics of every case he dis-
cusses. He correctly points out that, after Brown, the Court “abandoned any 
effort to develop a meaningful desegregation jurisprudence for well over a dec-
ade.”
230
 This had a hugely dilatory effect on the path of school desegrega-
tion.
231
 The Court belatedly got back on the field in Green v. County School 
Board in 1968.
232
 Driver rightly praises Green for introducing the “affirmative 
duty doctrine” to the school-desegregation pantheon.
233
 But then the Court 
moved sideways and ultimately reversed course. Driver analogizes the trio of 
decisions following Green—Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion,
234
 Keyes v. School District No. 1,
235
 and Milliken v. Bradley
236
—to a traffic 
light that first “flashed a cautionary yellow before turning solidly red.”
237
 Driv-
er also notes that all three cases implicate “the use of busing for desegrega-
tion”
238
 and a distinction between de jure and de facto segregation, but there 
was much more underlying these cases that is worth exploring here. 
In Swann, the Court ruled—for the first time—that federal district courts 
had broad authority to order specific remedies for school segregation. The 
most important and controversial of these remedies was busing. There is much 
that Driver gets right about Swann. He notes how the case provided federal 
district courts with broad authority to combat de jure segregation, including 
the power to gerrymander school attendance zones and order race-based stu-
dent assignments.
239
 And he unearths a key point that many forget—that the 
Court in Swann explicitly recognized that school districts “retained discretion 
to consider the race of students to promote integration,”
240
 even if district 
courts lacked the power to order it. This point is important because it under-
mines the Court’s dubious determination in Parents Involved that the school 
 
230. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 243. 
231. Id. at 262-63 (“[A]fter issuing Brown II, the Court—incomprehensibly—disengaged from 
the field for the next thirteen years.”). 
232. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
233. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 263 (discussing Green, which imposed an affirmative duty on school 
officials to “take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which 
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch”). 
234. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
235. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
236. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
237. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 264. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. at 268. 
240. Id. at 268-69. 
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districts had gone too far in their attempts to maintain racially integrated 
schools. In Swann, the Court didn’t just give federal district court judges broad 
discretion to chop away at educational Jim Crow; it recognized that local edu-
cators had that authority, too. The Court held that 
school authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formu-
late and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for ex-
ample, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society 
each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students 
reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an edu-
cational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authori-
ties.
241
 
Take that, Chief Justice Roberts. 
The Schoolhouse Gate provides a textured narrative about the battle over 
busing in Brown’s progeny. In his discussion of Swann, Driver canvasses con-
temporaneous newspaper articles that emphasized busing,
242
 zooms in on a 
suburban Charlotte homeowner who began a parental regional organization to 
oppose busing,
243
 and analyzes contemporaneous polling of Americans’ atti-
tudes toward busing.
244
 He also discusses President Nixon’s March 1970 mag-
num opus—his 8,191-word policy statement on school desegregation that sig-
naled his opposition to busing.
245
 
There is no question that busing was an enormous topic of discussion and 
tension in the early 1970s.
246
 But also important is why busing was such a sig-
nificant domestic policy issue. Swann (and Keyes and Milliken) are about much 
more than just busing. 
Busing is not an inherently controversial subject. Busing is simply a mode 
of transportation—a way for students to get to and from school—with a long 
 
241. Id. at 269 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) 
(emphasis added)). 
242. Id. at 256-66. 
243. Id. at 266. 
244. Id. at 271-72. 
245. Id. at 267; see also Richard Nixon, Statement About Desegregation of Elementary and Secondary 
Schools, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Mar. 24, 1970), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu
/documents/statement-about-desegregation-elementary-and-secondary-schools [https://
perma.cc/JT3X-X9J6] (“I have consistently expressed my opposition to any compulsory 
busing of pupils beyond normal geographic school zones for the purpose of achieving racial 
balance.”). 
246. MATTHEW F. DELMONT, WHY BUSING FAILED: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE 
TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 5 (2016). 
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history in American public schools.
247
 And that history was largely uncontro-
versial when busing served the interests of white students. For a time, the luxu-
ry of taking a bus to school was one largely reserved for white students.
248
 
Moreover, white students were often bused to avoid integration.
249
 
Busing only became an issue when the race of the students taking the bus 
changed.
250
 When busing became a means to integrate schools in the early 
1970s, it took on a charged social meaning. White parents and their allies were 
spectacularly successful in recharacterizing the school-desegregation issue, re-
framing the question in ways that had enormous constitutional, political, and 
moral ramifications. They turned the question of whether black Americans 
would finally achieve equal educational opportunity into an instrumental ques-
tion concerning point-to-point transportation and the inviolability of neigh-
borhood schools. As a leading scholar of the era put it, “White parents and pol-
iticians framed their resistance to school desegregation in terms of ‘busing’ and 
‘neighborhood schools.’ This rhetorical shift allowed them to support white 
schools and neighborhoods without using explicitly racist language.”
251
 School 
desegregation and the drive to eliminate Jim Crow—i.e., “forced integration”—
became something that the federal government was doing to white parents ra-
ther than for black students. 
In Swann, the Court approved busing as one of several means of achieving 
desegregation. Driver notes that Chief Justice Burger thought that the case lim-
ited rather than expanded court authority to order busing and, thus, believed 
that Swann had been misrepresented.
252
 Driver appears to agree with Burger’s 
analysis, writing that “Swann might more accurately be understood not by the 
constraints it placed on segregating school districts but instead by the con-
straints it placed on the federal judiciary.”
253
 To be sure, Swann came with more 
qualifications than many civil rights advocates might have desired.
254
 But it is 
 
247. Id. at 2 (“Students in the United States had long ridden buses to school, and the number of 
students transported to school at public expense in the United States expanded from 
600,000 in 1920 to 20,000,000 in 1970.”). 
248. Id. 
249. Id. (“In other parts of the South, as well as New York, Boston, and other northern cities, 
students rode buses past closer neighborhood schools to more distant schools to maintain 
segregation.”). 
250. Id.; see also id. at 172-73. 
251. Id. at 3. 
252. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 272. 
253. Id. at 273. 
254. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24, 30, 32 (1971) (finding that 
students’ travel time may be too long in some cases and imposing neither a requirement of 
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also worth noting that Swann invested district courts with significant remedial 
authority. Chief Justice Burger wrote that “[o]nce a right and a violation have 
been shown, the scope of the district court’s equitable powers to remedy past 
wrongs is broad.”
255
 This concept of judicial power allowed federal district 
courts to desegregate large metropolitan areas. Of course, Chief Justice Burger 
sidestepped an opportunity to issue an unambiguous nationwide desegregation 
rule, one that would have applied in the North as well as the South.
256
 Many 
southerners pointed to ubiquitous racial segregation in the North and cried 
foul.
257
 
There is also a key passage in Swann that can be read to bridge the so-called 
de jure and de facto regimes that would later come to define the limits of deseg-
regation. In a particularly trenchant passage, the Court recognized the complex 
interrelationship between school and housing segregation: 
In addition to the classic pattern of building schools specifically intend-
ed for Negro or white students, school authorities have sometimes, 
since Brown, closed schools which appeared likely to become racially 
mixed through changes in neighborhood residential patterns. This was 
sometimes accompanied by building new schools in the areas of white 
suburban expansion farthest from Negro population centers in order to 
maintain the separation of the races with a minimum departure from 
the formal principles of “neighborhood zoning.” Such a policy does 
more than simply influence the short-run composition of the student 
body of a new school. It may well promote segregated residential pat-
terns which, when combined with “neighborhood zoning,” further lock 
the school system into the mold of separation of the races. Upon a prop-
er showing a district court may consider this in fashioning a remedy.
258
 
Perhaps Swann can be read, as Chief Justice Burger would have preferred, as a 
limited authorization of desegregation measures.
259
 But Swann’s limitations co-
existed alongside equally tantalizing possibilities. Swann did not reach out to 
 
any particular degree of race mixing nor a requirement to make year-by-year adjustments of 
the racial composition of the student body). 
255. Id. at 15. 
256. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 270. 
257. Id. 
258. Swann, 402 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added). 
259. Fred P. Graham, Burger Cautions Lower Tribunals on Busing Orders, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 
1971), https://www.nytimes.com/1971/09/01/archives/burger-cautions-lower-tribunals-on
-busing-orders-says-rulings-by.html [https://perma.cc/FT4L-8U82]. 
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establish nationwide desegregation guidelines. But it did lay the foundation for 
a case that might. Most importantly, both what was at stake and what could 
conceivably have been achieved went far beyond mere busing. 
C. The De Jure/De Facto Illusion 
Analyzing Keyes v. School District No. 1 offers another opportunity to inter-
rogate the de jure/de facto distinction.
260
 In an opinion authored by Justice 
Brennan, the Court effectively embraced the idea that segregation’s causes var-
ied by region. Keyes established that there were two different liability rules for 
establishing a Brown violation. In the South, where there was a clear history of 
state-imposed school segregation mandated by positive law, the Court essen-
tially presumed liability. That was the essence of Green’s “affirmative duty” 
mandate.
261
 After Green, the burden was on southern school authorities to 
“come forward with a [desegregation] plan that promises realistically to work, 
and promises realistically to work now.”
262
 But in the North and the West, the 
presumption cut the other way. In the absence of positive law either requiring 
or permitting school segregation, plaintiffs needed to “prove that the school 
authorities have carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a 
substantial portion of the students, schools, teachers, and facilities within the 
school system.”
263
 This meant that plaintiffs had to show that school authori-
ties intentionally segregated at least a “meaningful portion of the school sys-
tem.”
264
 This distinction, in effect, created a firewall against “all out” desegre-
gation in the North. 
In order for the de jure/de facto distinction to make sense, however, there 
has to be some meaningful difference between the two types of segregation. 
Otherwise, the distinction loses explanatory force. Racial segregation in north-
ern schools was and is typically labeled “de facto,” meaning adventitious, acci-
dental, customary, or otherwise the result of private choices. Driver’s analysis 
assumes that de facto segregation has some independent, explanatory force.
265
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262. Id. at 439. 
263. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 201. 
264. Id. at 208. 
265. Driver comes closest to acknowledging that “de facto” is a misnomer on page 280 where he 
states: “[T]he Court wrongly perpetuated the fiction that many communities existed 
throughout the nation where racial minorities simply happened to cluster due to their own 
preferences, rather than being forced into racialized ghettos through a complex web of mu-
tually reinforcing public and private exclusions.” DRIVER, supra note 1, at 280. He continues: 
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But, as Richard Rothstein has recently explained in the context of residential 
segregation (which dependably delivers school segregation), there really is no 
such thing as de facto segregation; instead, it is all de jure.
266
 
The validity of the de jure/de facto distinction lies at the core of the Court’s 
limiting of desegregation and is a concept that decades after Keyes, the Court 
was still struggling to reconcile. In Freeman v. Pitts in 1992, for instance, three 
Republican appointees questioned whether demographic shifts and private 
choice could fairly explain school segregation. They wrote: 
[The district] claims that it need not remedy the segregation in DeKalb 
County schools because it was caused by demographic changes for 
which [it] has no responsibility. It is not enough, however, for [the dis-
trict] to establish that demographics exacerbated the problem . . . . 
[Much closer] examination is necessary because what might seem to be 
purely private preferences in housing may in fact have been created, in 
part, by actions of the school district. . . . [S]chools that are demonstra-
bly black or white provide a signal to these families, perpetuating and 
intensifying the residential movement.
267
 
Moreover, the duty to desegregate schools does not go away simply because 
demographic shifts occur. “[A] school district is not responsible for all of socie-
ty’s ills, but it bears full responsibility for schools that have never been deseg-
regated.”
268
 
While it is beyond the scope of The Schoolhouse Gate to substantively inter-
rogate the distinction between de jure and de facto itself, Driver does criticize 
Keyes for requiring school-segregation plaintiffs in the North and West to 
“hunt for bad actors” and for clinging to “the de jure/de facto distinction.”
269
 
 
“The Court’s emphasis on discriminatory intent seems particularly misguided in the educa-
tional sphere, moreover, because it obfuscates how segregated schools are invariably the 
product of some official government action, namely the assignment of students to attend 
designated schools.” Id. But then in the very next sentence, Driver uses the term “de facto 
segregation” in a manner that unnecessarily confuses the point. He writes: “Perpetuating de 
facto segregation in schools by retaining pupil assignment plans should not, however, be 
understood as tantamount to making a decision at all.” Id. at 280-81. Were school officials 
“perpetuating de facto segregation”? Or were the school officials’ actions—as state actors—
directly attributable to the government and consequently de jure? 
266. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERN-
MENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017). 
267. 503 U.S. 467, 512-13 (1992). 
268. Id. at 514. 
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He argues that the Court should have adopted the approach advanced by Jus-
tice Powell in a separate opinion in the case. Justice Powell famously had been 
chairman of the segregationist Richmond, Virginia, school board when Brown 
was decided,
270
 and he had submitted an antibusing amicus brief in the Swann 
case.
271
 Given his background, Justice Powell surprised many by suggesting 
that the Court abandon regional distinctions and effectively adopt a strict-
liability rule in all school-desegregation cases.
272
 Justice Powell would have re-
quired local school boards across the country to “operate integrated school sys-
tems within their respective districts.”
273
 Moreover, he recognized that the de 
jure/de facto distinction was chimerical. In Keyes, Powell wrote that “there is 
also not a school district in the United States, with any significant minority 
school population, in which the school authorities—in one way or the other—
have not contributed in some measure to the degree of segregation which still 
prevails.”
274
 Driver also points to the “knock on” effect that the earlier adoption 
of Powell’s standard in the school-desegregation context might have had in 
other areas of equal protection law. He argues that had the Court accepted 
Powell’s standard in Keyes, then perhaps Washington v. Davis
275
 might have 
come out differently.
276
 
One would have thought that Justice Brennan would be the very first to 
sign on to such an approach. But he declined to do so. Driver suggests that Jus-
tice Powell failed to attract Justice Brennan’s support because there were 
strings attached. Justice Powell would vote to jettison the de jure/de facto dis-
tinction but only if the liberals jettisoned their attachment to busing. As Driver 
puts it, “Cutting against this sweeping remedy, however, Powell did aim in 
Keyes to dial back the status quo in one major respect: he would not have obli-
gated schools to bus students with the purpose of maximizing integration, even 
in areas of de jure segregation.”
277
 Driver wishes that a deal could have been 
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cut. Throughout The Schoolhouse Gate, he repeatedly expresses his admiration 
for Justice Powell’s elegant, nationwide approach to establishing liability for 
school segregation. And Driver argues that Justice Powell’s well-known at-
tachment to the neighborhood school might have been more flexible than it 
first appeared.
278
 Thus, Driver’s position is that “the Supreme Court should 
have interpreted the Constitution to require school districts to pursue racial in-
tegration throughout the nation regardless of their recent history—taking a cue 
from Justice Powell’s opinion in Keyes, even if it declined to adopt his aversion 
to busing.”
279
 
The first question is whether there were ever five votes for this proposition. 
John Jeffries, Lewis Powell’s biographer, suggested that the answer to this 
question was no.
280
 But given how things turned out, perhaps Justice Brennan 
miscalculated and should have accepted Justice Powell’s condition. There are at 
least two responses to this view. First, perhaps Justice Brennan resisted Justice 
Powell because busing was the only feasible way to obtain cross-district integra-
tion. Again, busing is instrumental, not an end in and of itself. Justice Powell’s 
approach would have required local school boards to “operate integrated school 
systems within their respective districts.”
281
 Justice Powell placed emphasis on 
the phrase “integrated school systems,” but the phrase “within their respective 
districts” is equally if not more important.
282
 He favored a nationwide rule 
 
fateful consequences, not only for the school cases, but for equal protection doctrine gener-
ally.”). John Jeffries tells the story a bit differently. On his telling, it was Justice Brennan 
who offered a deal to Justice Powell: “Brennan had offered to take Powell’s views on the de 
facto-de jure distinction but not on busing. The offer, however, was contingent. Brennan 
would change his opinion if he could get majority support—that is, if Powell tendered his 
vote.” JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 303 (1994). But Jeffries confirms 
the gravamen of the deal; in order to get a uniform national rule, Powell would have to give 
up his opposition to busing. Id. 
278. DRIVER, supra note 1, at 278 (“Powell made clear that he used the term ‘neighborhood 
school’ in an elastic sense—meaning not necessarily the absolute closest school to one’s resi-
dence but instead indicating a preference for assigning students to schools closer, rather 
than further, from their homes.”). 
279. Id. at 281. 
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mandating integration but that rule only operated within and not between dis-
tricts.
283
 By the early 1970s, it was becoming increasingly clear that a great deal 
of segregation was operating at the school-district rather than the individual-
school level, as had been the case in Brown.
284
 “Within their respective dis-
tricts” ties the Brown integration mandate to a specific and often residentially 
segregated place. From this perspective, one could easily imagine that “within 
their respective districts” meant “within their separate districts.” Given subur-
banization and the sheer size of many metropolitan areas, it is difficult to imag-
ine how children from different school districts would be educated together ab-
sent busing. Second, as Myron Orfield has helpfully explained, the Keyes 
liability rule led to overwhelming success for plaintiffs.
285
 Perhaps Justice 
Brennan was right to stick to his guns. 
Milliken v. Bradley
286
 is by far the most problematic of the trilogy of the ear-
ly 1970s “busing” cases that Driver highlights. In Milliken, the Supreme Court 
overturned a city-suburban desegregation plan.
287
 The Court rationalized its 
rejection of the multidistrict plan by closely linking the constitutional violation 
to the remedy sought.
288
 The constitutional violation was de jure segregation 
within the city of Detroit.
289
 The remedy could not exceed the scope of the vio-
lation. Consequently, the Court ruled that suburban school districts that had 
not formally engaged in racial discrimination in Detroit could not be included 
in a larger integration plan.
290
 
Driver opens his discussion of this case by stating that “[t]he litigation de-
cision to target the state was driven by the metropolitan area’s racial de-
mographics, which featured a heavily black city (served by the Detroit Public 
Schools) surrounded by a ring of overwhelmingly white suburbs (each of 
which operated its own school system).”
291
 While that description of the de-
mographic breakdown is true, technically speaking, the reason why the plain-
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tiffs sued the State of Michigan was because the state legislature had passed a 
statute expressly nullifying a high-school integration plan that had been adopt-
ed by the liberal-leaning Detroit Board of Education.
292
 The State was a de-
fendant because it engaged in classic de jure segregation in the city of De-
troit.
293
 When the lawsuit was filed, the plaintiffs’ attorneys were not certain 
what kind of relief they wanted.
294
 But there was a finding of liability against 
the State (which was never disturbed on appeal), and under Michigan law, ed-
ucation is very much a state function.
295
 It was against this background that 
federal district court Judge Roth required the suburban school districts to par-
ticipate in the desegregation remedy. 
Milliken is perhaps the most important school-desegregation case after 
Brown for at least three reasons. First, Milliken rewrote history. In its opinion, 
the Supreme Court ruled that Roth’s remedy was not supported by the 
evidence because the suburban school districts did not cause Detroit’s schools 
to be segregated. According to the Court, how Detroit and its suburbs came to 
look as they did was anyone’s guess, as the “predominantly Negro school 
population in Detroit [was] caused by unknown and perhaps unknowable 
factors.”
296
 But the record amply demonstrated the relationship between school 
and housing segregation and the state’s (and the federal government’s) 
culpability in creating the stark racial divisions between city and suburb. 
Second, Milliken fortified and strengthened school-district lines, the 
geographical fences that separate our children based on race and class. During 
the Jim Crow era, black children were confined to all-black schools. Brown later 
held that kind of overt discrimination unconstitutional. The lesson of Milliken 
is that, absent extraordinary circumstances, children should attend school 
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where they live. But because of residential segregation, black and other 
minority students are largely concentrated in the urban core or in separate 
suburban neighborhoods and, within those areas, to separate school districts. 
These areas are not just racially segregated. Then as now, black children are far 
more likely than white children to live in high-poverty neighborhoods. So 
when it comes to neighborhood-level segregation (which, in turn, produces 
school segregation), black children are segregated by race and class. Third, 
Milliken provided whites who wanted to avoid desegregation with a clear-cut 
exit strategy. The suburbs held out the promise of an exclusive “whites-only” 
existence. Milliken did not create white flight, but it certainly encouraged it. 
Consistent with the framework through which Driver analyzes the Brown 
progeny, he writes about Milliken as a busing case. He notes that there was a 
“bitter chasm” within the black community on its views on busing.
297
 There 
were definitely differences of opinion on busing in the black community during 
that time.
298
 But it is helpful to dig deeper on this point. 
Driver argues that “traditional civil rights organizations” and “many black 
citizens” disagreed on the issues of busing, pointing to the NAACP’s public po-
sitions for support.
299
 While the NAACP was the largest black membership or-
ganization in the country at the time,
300
 its views were not just those of the or-
ganization’s board of directors. It is also important to note that Milliken was 
the culmination of a larger black-activist-led movement to desegregate the 
public schools in the North that dated back to the late 1950s.
301
 The leaders and 
participants in that movement were certainly “black citizens.”
302
 Additionally, 
as Driver notes, black newspapers “almost without exception also reviled [these 
cases],”
303
 and black newspapers tended to reflect the views of the mass of the 
black citizenry. Finally, the true goal of integration was not to get white kids 
into black schools so that blacks could “teach or learn effectively.”
304
 Rather, in-
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tegration was a “tying strategy.”
305
 The integration approach was driven by an 
understanding that 
[a]s long as blacks were in separate schools, many believed, they would 
always be shortchanged. Separate was never going to be equal, and the 
equalization suits tended to confirm this impression. The best and per-
haps only way for blacks to receive an education equal to whites was to 
attend the same schools. That way, white dominated legislatures and 
school officials could not benefit white students without also benefiting 
black ones, or harm black students without also harming whites. De-
segregation, from this perspective, was not so much an end in itself as a 
means to an end. It was a tying strategy, essentially, where black stu-
dents would tie their fates to white students because, as the saying 
went, green follows white.
306
 
Recent work by labor economists supports this conclusion, demonstrating the 
extraordinarily positive impact of court-ordered desegregation on black stu-
dents across a variety of indicia including higher educational and occupational 
attainment, improved health, and reduced rates of incarceration.
307
 For all these 
reasons, the “busing cases” were about much more than a means of transporta-
tion—they were about achieving the ends of equal access to education. 
conclusion  
The Schoolhouse Gate demonstrates that education law is among the most 
significant areas in constitutional law, worthy of its own independent treatment 
and capable of teaching broader lessons about judicial authority and capacity. 
More specifically, the book shows just how much the Court can achieve when it 
chooses to intervene, even in the face of enormous cultural controversy. In this 
Review, we have attempted to show that the Court’s reluctance to recognize the 
full extent of the Constitution’s demands in public education leaves essential 
obligations unfulfilled, trapping millions of children in conditions that deny 
them education adequacy and racial equity. 
 
305. JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS, AND THE STO-
RY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 27-29 (2010). 
306. Id. at 28. 
307. Rucker C. Johnson, Long-Run Impacts of School Desegregation & School Quality on Adult At-
tainments (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16664, 2015), https://www
.nber.org/papers/w16664 [https://perma.cc/NM5W-5H58]. 
the yale law journal 128:2302  2019 
2354 
When the Court validates constitutional rights and norms in schools, it ex-
tends the horizon of opportunity for millions of students. Sometimes that 
means students can learn to engage in political debate without fearing a repres-
sive disciplinary response. Other times that means students will be free from 
government coercion—explicit or implicit—to participate in religious activities 
as they strive to define their own spiritual imperatives. The Court’s interven-
tion can even result in the transformation of the entire structure of schooling, 
prompting the transformation of broader society. School systems, for instance, 
have gone from places designed primarily to serve students of one race, gender, 
and ethnicity to engines of opportunity for all students. With this change, the 
operative norms that purported to justify the former regime of repression, ex-
clusion, and discrimination are repudiated. 
The work of achieving equal educational opportunity is undoubtedly diffi-
cult and likely to be prolonged. Entrenched cultural forces often militate 
against it, and this enterprise requires examining the nuances of educational 
policy and practice, a field replete with new and sometimes competing social-
science claims, making it uncomfortable terrain for judges. The Court, to its 
credit, has not run from all of these issues. The Schoolhouse Gate cogently iden-
tifies the Court’s most consequential interventions to enforce constitutional 
promises of equality and freedom of conscience. 
The full measure of the Court’s impact, however, requires acknowledging 
both what the Court has given and what it has taken away. Driver tracks how 
the Court has vacillated in its enforcement of certain rights but stops short of 
what could have been a much more critical account.
308
 A holistic normative as-
sessment of the Court’s interventions, noninterventions, and retractions is not 
flattering. The Court has said “no” to students on matters of enormous signifi-
cance quite often. The Court has also said “yes” in important cases only to later 
retract or nullify the original mandate in later controversies. The net result of 
the Court’s noninterventions and retractions is the perpetuation of a tremen-
dous amount of behavior that either used to be, or should have been, prohibit-
ed. That behavior—funding inequality, resource inadequacy, segregation, and 
zero tolerance—then becomes constitutionally normalized, a result that de-
forms constitutional expectations far beyond the public schools. 
The treatment of the right to education and desegregation provides two of 
the most troubling illustrations of how the Court’s education jurisprudence 
disappoints. For more than half a century, the Court issued decisions that sug-
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gested that education would receive special protection under the U.S. Constitu-
tion and that, in the right case, it would recognize education as a fundamental 
right. But when the moment of decisive action came, the Court demurred, an-
nouncing a doctrine that would have extensive ramifications for students’ 
hopes of enjoying the full measure of political and economic citizenship. Nearly 
half a century later, the Court’s decision in Rodriguez continues to shape the 
structure of educational opportunity and governmental duty in problematic 
ways. 
Although distinct from the campaign to secure a federal right to education, 
the effort to preserve Brown v. Board’s legacy has faced increasing opposition 
from the Court. Litigants spent decades paving the way for the Court to strike 
down segregation. When Brown finally reached the Court, its basic holding 
confirmed the value of that struggle. The Court began to build on Brown’s 
foundation, issuing decisions in the late 1960s and early 1970s that vastly ex-
panded the scope of the desegregation imperative. Regrettably, the Court then 
spent four decades thwarting desegregation at every turn. By some accounts, 
those decisions erased nearly all of integration’s gains, leaving our schools as 
segregated today as they were in the early 1970s.
309
 
Cases like Rodriguez, Brown, and their progeny represent opportunities for 
the Court’s work to matter tremendously. While the Court has been true to the 
Constitution’s commands and brave enough to follow them on important occa-
sions, it has refused to do so in equally vital moments. Such refusals inflict 
deep wounds. The Court may be the last resort for many young people seeking 
to realize their hopes for equal access to what the Court itself describes as a 
“fundamental obligation of government to its constituency.”
310
 A Court that 
turns its back on those claims weakens the Constitution it is charged with en-
forcing. 
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